Thursday, April 2, 2015

2/4/15: Irish Consumer Sentiment and Expectations: March 2015


In recent months, Irish Consumer Confidence Index (officially known as Consumer Sentiment Index and prepared and published by the ESRI) has been re-establishing sufficiently strong positive correlation with retail sales data, which warrants its re-inclusion in my coverage of the Irish economy as a stand alone series to track.

Hence, this more in-depth than usual analysis of dynamics in the Consumer Sentiment data.

March 2015 reading for the headline Consumer Sentiment Index came in at 97.8 up on 96.1 in February, but still below 101.1 registered in January. January reading was the highest since February 2006 (109 months high) and March reading is the second highest reading since May 2006. So by all measures, consumer confidence is booming in Ireland.

March reading is almost on par with pre-crisis average (through December 2007) which stands at 99.2 and significantly above the average for the period from January 2012 through present (the recovery period) which stands at 71.8. Year on year, index is up 14.8 points.

Given January reading, the 3mo MA through March is now at 98.3 - the highest 3mo MA reading since March 2006.

These levels of sentiment are simply not consistent with the retail sales data, as I noted before, but are close to the longer-term trend and consistent with the recovery. In addition, volume of retail sales index is now co-trending with consumer Sentiment index as covered here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/03/27315-irish-retail-sales-february-2015.html - a pattern that was established around July 2013.



The elevated level of y/y rises in Consumer Sentiment Index, set on from December 2013 is a positive indicator of firming up volume activity in consumer demand, although not as strong of an indicator, yet, of the value of consumer demand. If the value of retail sales starts to catch up with consumer confidence, we are going to see significant boost to the domestic demand side of the National Accounts in later quarters of the year, pushing economic growth away from the questionable external trade stats and in favour of more domestic growth.


Index of Current Economic Conditions meanwhile, rose to 110.0 in March from 107.2 in February. This marks the second highest reading for the index since March 2006, with the highest reading recorded in January 2015 at 112.8. Again, index reads boom-time territory. It is only 16.8 points below all-time high and just 2.9 points behind post 2006 high. Current reading is up 19.6 points year on year - strong growth - strongest since April 2014. And index 3mo average though March is at 110.0 which is also the second highest 3mo average for the index from March 2006.



Again, the recovery is clearly visible in y/y growth rates starting from December 2013 and index readings are now above pre-crisis average.


Index of Consumer Expectations is showing more subdued increases, rising to 89.6 in March from 88.6 in February. However, as with other two indices, Consumer expectations currently sit at the second highest reading from May 2006, with the highest reading recorded in January 2015 at 93.2. Year on year index is up 11.5 - the slowest increase in 3 months and second slowest rise in 8 months. Still, 3mo average though March 2015 is now at the highest level for 3mo average series since March 2006.



Consumer Expectations, for now, remain below pre-crisis average, but trending up strongly, with elevated y/y rises from December 2013. Slight issue is - per chart above, y/y increases, while remaining strong, are now trending down off Q3 2014 highs.


Overall, Consumer Confidence indicators discussed above suggest full reversion of consumer sentiment and expectations to pre-crisis conditions. Much of this will have to be tested in more normal inflation environment in the future and I am not sure this confidence will be sustained then (higher inflation is likely to cut back on consumer purchases and expectations, while associated higher interest rates are likely to severely impair demand).

In other words, stay tuned for more regular analysis of the series in the future.

2/4/15: Oh... someone spotted US growth slowdown risk...


Given that even the Irish Stuffbrokers are starting to wake up to the ongoing slowdown in the US economic growth (yet to smell the traces of the global slowdown next), here is a chart worth contemplating:
Explaining the above, the authors, Markit say: the "Business Outlook Survey, which looks at expectations for the year ahead across 650 US private sector companies, highlighted that business sentiment remained positive in February, but the degree of optimism moderated to a post-crisis low."

More specifically: "At +24 percent, down from +31 percent in October 2014, the net balance of firms expecting a rise in business activity over the year ahead was the lowest since the survey began in late-2009. Weaker business sentiment was recorded in both manufacturing (+32 percent in February, down from +42 percent last October) and services (+22 percent in February, down from +29 percent)."

And here is the comparative to other major advanced economies:


Oh, and the US weakness is compounded (and compounds) broader expected global weakness: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/2415-bric-business-outlook-12-months.html and current ongoing slowdown: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/2415-bric-manufacturing-pmi-march-marks.html. Even though the Global PMI for Manufacturing sector came out with basically no change in March (51.8) compared to February (51.9), overall growth has been trending well below immediate post-crisis recovery years and pre-crisis period:


Just at the time when Irish official forecasters are revving up their numbers for 2015-2016, because being myopic is what we do best...

2/4/15: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: March Marks Further Slowdown in Growth


Markit released Manufacturing PMI for India, so here is a full update on Manufacturing sector indicators across the BRIC economies:

  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI fell to 46.2 in March from 49.6 in February, marking the second consecutive month of sub-50 readings. 3mo average through March was 48.8 against 3mo average through December 2014 at 49.3 and 3mo average through March 2014 at 50.6. The trend is down and getting worse. Brazil registered the sharpest rate of contraction in PMI of all BRIC economies.
  • Russia Manufacturing PMI also came in at disappointing 48.1, down from 49.7 in February, marking the 4th consecutive month of sub-50 readings. Russia posted the second sharpest contraction in manufacturing of all BRIC economies and the sharpest on a 3mo average basis. 3mo average through March was 48.5, down from 50.3 for the 3 months through December 2014, but up on 48.3 3mo average through March 2014.
  • China Manufacturing PMI came in at 49.6 in March, the first reading below 50.0 after 50.7 was registered in February 2015. However, over the last 6 months, Chinese manufacturing posted 3 months of sub-50 readings and one month of 50.0 reading. 3mo average through March stood at 50.0 - basically zero growth signal, against 3mo average through December 2014 at 50.1 (again, zero growth) and 3mo average through March 2014 of 48.7.
  • India posted the only rise in PMI and the only case of manufacturing PMI above 50.0. March reading was 52.1, a gain on 51.2 in February, marking 17th consecutive month of above-50 readings. 3mo average through March was 52.1, which is poorer than 3mo average through December 2014 (52.6) but an improvement year-on-year (3mo average through March 2014 was 51.7).
Chart and table to summarise:


Overall, with exception of India, all BRIC Manufacturing PMIs are now below 50.0 and all are trending down since July 2014 on. Brazil is now the worst performing country in the group, for the second month in a row.

Data presented by Markit signals a deepening slowdown in March compared to February in the group of core emerging markets, which does not bode well for global growth outlook.

2/4/15: Greece: Of Debt, Dreams and Realities


This is an unedited version of my current column in the Village magazine:


Ever since the October 2009 when the Greek Government finally faced up to the bond market pressures and admitted that its predecessor has falsified the national accounts, the euro area has been unable to shake off its sovereign debt crisis.

When the dust finally settled on revisions, the Greek debt to GDP ratio shot up from 98 percent at the start of 2009 to 133 percent of GDP in early 2010. Five years of subsequent Troika interventions, support programmes, enhanced agreements and debt restructurings underwritten the Greek debt to GDP ratio rise to 175 percent of GDP, the highest in the world for any country with a fixed exchange rate.

As The Economist wrote in April 2010, "Greece has become a symbol of government indebtedness. …It cannot grow out of trouble because of fiscal retrenchment and its lack of export prowess. It cannot devalue, because it is in the euro zone.” (Source: http://www.economist.com/node/16009099) The Economist went on to claim that despite these realities, Greeks “…seem unwilling to endure the cuts in wages and services needed to make the economy competitive.”


As we know now, the reality is far worse than that.

Contrary to The Economist (and the prevailing consensus across European elites and analysts), it was not the lack of the Greeks willingness "to endure the cuts in wages and services" that persistently and consistently undermined Athens' ability to reverse its economic fortunes.


Reality of Internal Devaluation

On the economy side, macro figures tell the story that can also be narrated through social and personal experiences of the Troika-impoverished nation.

Greek GDP per capita declined 22.5% in real terms from the end of 2007 through 2014, based on the latest estimates from the IMF. Ireland's decline (second largest in the Euro area) was half that at 11.9%. Total investment, as a share of GDP, fell 12.3 percentage points in Greece, against 10.8 percentage points in Ireland. This decline in investment was clearly accompanied by the internal devaluation: savings, as percentage of GDP, rose by 2.4 percentage points in Greece. In contrast, savings rate fell in Ireland by 3.0%.

Ireland is commonly presented as a country that has managed to deliver an exports-led recovery, while Greece is usually seen as a laggard in this area. This too is false. Greek current account balances improved by USD46.4 billion between January 2008 and the end of 2014, while Irish current account rose by USD22.5 billion. And as percentage of GDP, Greek current account gains amounted to 14.7 percentage points, against Ireland's 7.8 percentage points.

By all indicators, Greece has been dealing with the problems it faces, solidly in the Troika-prescribed direction.

In line with the internal devaluation ‘success’, the country employment and unemployment situation remain dire. Ratio of those in employment as percentage of total population, has declined 7.3 percentage points between 2007 and 2014 in Greece, much steeper than in Portugal (-4.6 percentage points), but less than in Ireland (-9.0 percentage points). Overall employment is down 18.8 percent on 2007 levels, compared to Ireland's 10.3 percent. Unemployment rate rose 17.5 percentage points between the end of 2007 and the end of last year in Greece, almost triple the rate of increase in Ireland (6.5 percent).

Unemployment and collapse in economic activity are two core factors driving down Government revenues and pushing up social protection spending. In Greece, state revenues fell 10.6 percent between 2007 and 2014, less than in Ireland (down 12 percent). Following Troika orders, Greek government expenditure was down 18.8 percent by the end of 2014 compared to the end of 2007. Ireland's 'best-in-class' austerity performance shrunk public spending by only 0.7 percent over the same period of time.

The 'un-reforming Greeks' have, thus, endured a much sharper rebalancing of public spending (a swing between revenue and expenditure adjustments of over 15 percent) than Ireland (downward adjustment of 6.4 percent).

The same is reflected in Government deficit figures. In 2007, Greek Government deficit was 6.81 percent of GDP. By the end of 2014 this fell to 2.69 percent - an improvement of 4.1 percentage points. In the same period of time, Irish deficits worsened 4.4 percentage points. Greek austerity was even more dramatic in terms of primary deficits (public deficits excluding interest payments on debt). Greek primary balance in 2014 was in surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP, up 3.52 percentage points on 2007 performance. Irish primary balance was in a deficit 0.3 percent of GDP, marking 1.1 percentage point worsening on 2007.


Is Competitiveness the Real Achilles’ Heel?

If internal devaluation were to be a measure of success, then Greece should be outstripping Ireland in terms of economic improvement. In reality it is severely lagging them.

The driving factor behind this outrun is not the current state of the Greek economy's competitiveness, but the legacy of pre-crisis debts accumulated by the country, plus the idiosyncratic nature of Greek and Irish crises and recovery paths.

Ireland came into 2008 with two economies running side-by-side: the domestic economy, dominated by the building and construction sector, rampant banks lending, asset bubble in property and unsustainable sources of funding for the Exchequer. This domestic side of the economy was contrasted and financially supported by the multinationals-led exporting economy based on decades-long tax arbitrage paraded in PR-speak as FDI. Collapse of the former economy was painful, but it helped sustain the latter economy, as the state avoided passing the pain onto the multinational sectors and dumped the entire economic adjustment burden onto households and domestic companies.

Greece had no such choice available. Its economy, when it comes to domestic firms, was marginally more competitive than the Irish one. But it had no MNCs-dominated tax arbitrage model on the exports side. Strikingly, pre-crisis, the index of unit labour costs – an imperfect, but still indicative metric of economic competitiveness –was signaling lower competitiveness in the Irish economy (including the MNCs) than in Greece. Since 2009, however, Greece deflated its labour costs by 26 percent more than double the 11 percent reduction achieved by Ireland.


Debt. Glorious Debt.

So the immediate problem with Greece is not a lack of competitiveness or a deficit of conviction to cut back on unsustainable expenditures. Instead, the problem is exactly the same one that plagued the country at the time of its national accounts revisions in 2009, and at the moment of it signing the first Memorandum of Understanding with the Troika in May 2010, as well as in February 2012, when the second bailout was ratified by the funding states.

That problem is the level of debt carried by the country.

Troika disbursed to Greece, directly and indirectly, vast amounts of funds over 2011-2012: some EUR337 billion worth of various financial assistance, mostly in the form of new debt, but also via restructuring of privately-held Government bonds.

As one third of the funds disbursed in both bailout programmes was used to retire maturing debt, parts of the old debt got swapped for the new one. Interest payments on debt swallowed another 1/6th of the entire bailout. In total, payouts to the private sector bondholders, banks recapitalisations and debt swaps and interest payments used up 81 percent of the total lending to Greece.

Little of the bail-out funding went on to lower the debt burden carried by the Greek economy and much of it went to increase the debt burden.

Instead of funding debt redemptions and interest payments at par via new debt, the EU could have written off close to one third of Greek debt held by the official lenders on terms similar to those carried out in the private sector restructuring. The new restructured debt could have been held interest-free in long maturities within the Eurosystem and/or indexed to economic recovery performance.

As we know, the Troika did no such thing, continuing to insist, throughout 2013 and 2014 that Greek debts are sustainable, until latest political reshuffling in Athens brought about yet another iteration of the crisis.



At the time of writing, Greece is facing an uncertain future.

In securing four months-long extension to the bailout in February, Athens had to sacrifice a number of core principles that served as the election platform for Syriza. The first victim was the idea of debt restructuring. Athens failed to ask for any debt writedowns in negotiating the extension. The second was the promise that the Government will not allow any extensions of the existent programme. Prior to the February agreement with the Eurogroup, Syriza planed for expanded public works programmes. These, along with other measures in the Syriza manifesto, were costed at EUR12-28 billion. February agreement puts Athens back onto pre-Syriza spending path. Syriza plans for using the funds left over from recapitalization of the banks to fund a fiscal stimulus programme have been effectively blown out of the water. And the dreaded Troika – the one that the new Government committed to abolishing – is still there, conveniently renamed ‘Institutions’.


With this, Greece has a very weak hand in shaping the post-June agreement.

Firstly, the ECB and the IMF have both already stressed that any new agreement will require Athens adhering to the terms and conditions of the previous programme.

Secondly, both the ECB and the IMF are holding serious trump card: over H2 2015, IMF is due repayment of EUR4.2 billion of maturing debt and the Eurosystem is due EUR6.7 billion. There’s roughly EUR 2 billion more of short-term debt maturing in July on top of that. Needless to say, even with the funds held by the EFSF, Greece has not enough money to cover these maturities and coupons due – a problem only exacerbated by the fact that January-February 2015 tax collection was severely impaired by the political mess.

All of this makes Greece insolvent and explains why the Syriza made such a public turnaround in its negotiations with the Troika in February. But it also means that following February decisions, the Greek crisis is now moving into a new stage not that much different from all the previous stages. Risks of policy errors,  political instability and the high likelihood of further deterioration in the fiscal and economic performance on foot of these cannot be left out of the equation.

Neither debt, nor economic stagnation, nor social decline, nor democratic will of the sovereign people can derail Europe’s dogmatic insistence on the self-destructive shaped by the self-defeating European institutions. As a living embodiment of Jean-Claude Juncker’s formula for Europe that “There can be no democratic choice against the treaties,”  Greece is set to soldier on: from one crisis to the next.

2/4/15: BRIC: Business Outlook 12 months ahead


Summary of BRIC economies Business Outlooks for 12 months ahead, via Markit:

India: "The Markit India Business Outlook survey points to sustained optimism among Indian companies. However, the net balance of +26 percent for overall output is the lowest in one year and below the both the BRIC and global averages. Weaker degrees of sentiment have been recorded across the manufacturing and service sectors, with the respective net balances registering +24 and +28 percent in February."


Russia (covered in more detail here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/2415-russia-business-outlook-q1-2015.html): Overall private sector outlook forward has improved at the mid-point of Q1 2015 compared to the start of Q4 2014 as headline % of companies expecting an increase in next 12 months minus % expecting a decline has risen to +20% from Q4 2014 record low of +10%. The net balance for expected goods production over the next 12 months has risen to +35%, the highest since October 2013." We are seeing effects of imports substitution.


China: "…continued optimism at Chinese companies regarding future business activity". "February’s net balance of +30 percent is up from +26 percent in the autumn to the highest reading in a year. The latest reading is also above both the BRIC and global averages (+28 percent and +27 percent, respectively). …A net balance of +28 percent of goods producers anticipate an expansion of output over the coming year, up from +25 percent in October. Meanwhile, a net balance of +32 percent of service providers forecast business activity to increase in the next 12 months. This is the highest net balance seen in the service sector since mid-2012."

Brazil: "private sector companies remain optimistic towards output growth in the coming 12 months. However, the business activity net balance has slipped from +44 percent last October to +28 percent, its lowest reading since composite data were first available in October 2009. Sentiment has deteriorated at manufacturers and service providers."

As the chart below summarises, BRIC expectations are more subdued than those in the major advanced economies, with exception for Japan and the US.

Click on the chart to enlarge

Overall, this data shows consistent trend toward moderation in business expectations across the BRIC economies into Q1 2015, signalling growing downside risks to global growth. So far, ex-India (yet to be reported), Manufacturing data for March PMI surveys suggests this trend continuing through the end of Q1.

2/4/15: Russia Business Outlook: Q1 2015


While we are waiting for Markit to publish the latest Services PMIs for BRIC economies and the last remaining Manufacturing PMI of the group for India, here are some interesting stats on longer-term outlook in the Russian economy.

Via Markit Russia Business Outlook survey for Q1 2015, covering business expectations 12 months forward:

  • Overall private sector outlook forward has improved at the mid-point of Q1 2015 compared to the start of Q4 2014 as headline % of companies expecting an increase in next 12 months minus % expecting a decline has risen to +20% from Q4 2014 record low of +10%. 
  • Nonetheless, as Markit notes, "the latest figure is still the joint-second lowest since the series began in late-2009."
  • "Moreover, among the countries surveyed globally, only Japan (+16%) and France (+19%) have weaker activity expectations than Russia."

Interesting point: per Markit, "The overall improvement in the business outlook has been driven by manufacturers. The net balance for expected goods production over the next 12 months has risen to +35%, the highest since October 2013." We are seeing effects of imports substitution.

Another point is that Services providers are much less optimistic: "...the services activity net balance has risen only slightly to +12%, the third lowest on record and the weakest figure among all

countries surveyed."

Core drivers for downside in expectations: "general weakness in the wider economy, a lack of working capital, high interest rates, inflation, currency fluctuations and a rising tax burden." Key risk, especially in the Services sector, is Capex: "... firms expect to cut capital expenditure over the next 12 months. The net balance for capex has trended lower since the start of 2013, and has fallen into negative territory in February for the first time, at -2%. This is also the lowest capex net balance of all countries surveyed. Service providers expect to cut capex (-3%) while the outlook at manufacturers is broadly neutral (+1%)."

Considering the above chart, the slowdown in the economic growth has become pronounced in Q4 2013, although structural weaknesses appear to set in around the ned of 2011. This is also consistent for the BRIC group overall as shown in the chart below:


Excluding Brazil (see my PMI analysis of the BRIC for more on this) all other BRIC economies have posted a sharp drop in expectations starting with Q1 2012. This trend remains persistent through Q1 2015, with Brazil joining the line up in full in Q1 2015.

Not a good sign for the global economic growth prospects...

Wednesday, April 1, 2015

1/4/15: H-W Sinn "Europe’s Easy-Money Endgame"


A very interesting op-ed by Professor Hans-Werner Sinn of German Ifo Institute for Project Syndicate: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/euro-demise-quantitative-easing-by-hans-werner-sinn-2015-03

The problem outlined by Professor Sinn is non-trivial.

"...for countries like Greece, Portugal, or Spain, regaining competitiveness would require them to lower the prices of their own products relative to the rest of the eurozone by about 30%, compared to the beginning of the crisis. Italy probably needs to reduce its relative prices by 10-15%. But Portugal and Italy have so far failed to deliver any such “real depreciation,” while relative prices in Greece and Spain have fallen by only 8% and 6%, respectively".

As Professor Sinn notes, there are four possible solutions:

  1. "Europe could become a transfer union, with the north giving more and more credit to the south and later waiving it." 
  2. "The south can deflate." 
  3. "The north can inflate." 
  4. "Countries that are no longer competitive can exit Europe’s monetary union and depreciate their new currency."

So here's the problem, correctly identified by Professor Sinn: "Each path is associated with serious complications. The first creates a permanent dependence on transfers, which, by sustaining relative prices, prevents the economy from regaining competitiveness. The second path drives many debtors in crisis countries into bankruptcy. The third expropriates the creditor countries of the north. And the fourth may cause contagion effects via capital markets, possibly forcing policymakers to introduce capital controls".

Now, note: Ireland has opted for the second path. Any surprise we are driving people into bankruptcy in tens of thousands (once current legal queue is taken into account), along with multiple businesses?

But back to Prof Sinn's analysis. Remember the ECB QE? Ok, says Prof Sinn, suppose it delivers on target inflation of just under 2%. What does it mean for internal devaluations in the 'peripheral' Europe?

"If, say, southern Europe kept its inflation rate at 0% and France inflated at a rate of 1%, Germany would have to inflate by a good 4%, and the rest of the eurozone at 2% annually, to reach a eurozone average of slightly less than 2%. This pattern would have to continue for about ten years to bring the eurozone back into balance. At that point, Germany’s price level would be about 50% higher than it is today."

The problem, thus, is an unresolvable dilemma, since with that sort of arithmetic, we are in a tough bind:

  • Either Germany runs mild inflation, while the 'periphery' runs outright deflation, allowing - over a painfully long period of time (decade or more) to devalue the imbalances, or
  • Eurozone pursues Mr Draghi's objective of 'just under' 2% inflation across the entire Euro area at the expense of Germany (and the rest of the already shrunken 'core').
Do note, I have argued before that deflation in the 'periphery' is not a bad thing, as it allows for the interest rates to remain low (servicing cost of household and corporate debts is lower) and deleveraging of the households and companies to be less painful, while sustaining some domestic demand through increased purchasing power of incomes. So I agree with Professor Sinn's criticism of the ECB QE programme. 

The problem is that this means, as Professor Sinn rightly suggests, continued suppression of demand (the 'austerity' bit).

The choice faced by Europe are ugly. All of them. And there are no guarantees for any of them to actually work. And the cause of this problem is singular: creation of a political currency union. For anyone who says that Greece, Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Ireland and Spain have caused their own problems, the replies are both simple and complex: 
  • The simple one: absent the euro, their problems would have been by now solved by a combination of the old-fashioned defaults and devaluations. 
  • The complex one: absent monetary transfers (lower interest rates and ample bank liquidity flowing cross-borders) with the EMU from the late 1990s through 2007, the imbalances generated in the 'peripheral' economies would never have been this large. Which means that the simple reply above would have been even more easy to apply.

1/4/15: St. Petersburg's Finec Students Visit Dublin


It was a real pleasure last week to speak to a group of students from St. Petersburg State University of Economics (Finec) during their visit to The College of Business, DIT as a part of the joint MSc programme.

Very informing Q&A and subsequent discussions. One very pressing topic, raised by students was the perception of Russia in Ireland and in Europe.


This was an open event for IRBA members too, so quite a few came over to the presentations and Q&A. 

1/4/15: Greek Crisis: Gaining Rhetorical Speed


So Greece is on- off- today in relation to the upcoming repayment of the IMF EUR450 million tranche due April 9. And no, it ain't April Fools Day joke.

Reuters reported as much here: http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSB4N0VR02320150401?irpc=932 and a more detailed report is here: http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/griechenland-will-sich-nicht-an-iwf-zahlungsfrist-halten-a-1026697.html. Subsequently, the claim (made on the record) was denied: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11509302/Greece-threatens-international-default-without-fresh-bail-out-cash.html

What happens if Greece does go into the arrears via-a-vis the IMF? Here is the IMF position paper on what happens in these cases: http://www.imf.org/external/np/tre/ofo/2001/eng/090501.pdf
And here are the Measures for Prevention/Deterrence of Overdue Financial Obligations to the Fund—Strengthened Timetable of Procedures as tabulated in the above report:



Which means that, in the nutshell, little beyond bureaucratic notifying and meetings takes place within the first 3 months of the breach. Nothing in terms of IMF penalties, that is. The markets, of course, will be a different matter altogether.

Meanwhile, Greece is rolling back on some past 'reforms':


And is planning on asking for more money soon:

This is some sort of a Chicken Game head-on road competition, while dumping petrol on the way... for speed...

1/4/15: Irish Manufacturing PMI: March 2015


Markit/Investec Manufacturing PMI for Ireland came out today showing continued and robust growth in the sector (or in the sub-sample of the sector covered by the survey).

Per Markit: "The Irish manufacturing sector registered a further strong improvement in operating conditions during March, helped by a series-record rise in employment. Job creation was linked to a further sharp increase in output requirements amid strong new order growth. The recent weakness of the euro against both the US dollar and sterling led to a first increase in input prices in three months."

Balmy conditions in the sector have meant that the PMI slipped somewhat from the scorching hot reading of 57.5 in February to a hot and humid 56.8 in March. Trend is flattening out, as expected, given the already surreal readings and the fact that the index has been over 50.0 for 22 consecutive months and within statistically significant difference from 50.0 for 19 months straight.



Aside from the above, anecdotal evidence - from one of the larger trade bodies - suggests that externally trading SMEs are now showing serious uptick in their exporting activity due to improved exchange rate environment.

Cited by Markit employment outlook strength is confirmed by today's Live Register data for February 2015 which shows:

  1. Significant declines in Live Register y/y
  2. Broad declines in Live Register across duration of registrations (long- and short-term supports); and
  3. Broad declines in Live Register by occupation, with all occupations posting decreases in LR.
So on the net - good news.

1/4/15: Export@Google March 2015


My recent conversation about the state of the global markets, economy and everything for Export@Google event last month



This is now available on youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnoH_ndAQRI



1/4/15: Russian Manufacturing PMI: March 2015


Russian Manufacturing PMI (Markit & HSBC) for March came in with new disappointment: the indicator slipped to 48.1 from 49.7 in February. This marks the second lowest reading in the series since June 2009 (the lowest reading since June 2009 was recorded in January this year at 47.6).

from Markit release: "production and new business both recorded mild declines. Employment also fell, but at a weaker rate with consumer goods producers recording modest growth. There was some positive news on the inflation front, as input and output prices continued to rise, but to much slower degrees than seen at the start of the year".

Overall trend toward deepening contraction in the Manufacturing remains:


Ironically, February improvement in PMI to 49.7 (still below 50.0) means that 3mo average for Q1 2015 is now at 48.5 which is better than 3mo average for Q1 2014 (48.3), if only marginally. This is despite the fact that in March 2014, PMI was reading 48.3 against 48.1 in March 2015.

As reminder, Russian Manufacturing PMIs first slipped below 50 in July 2013 and remained below 50 in 15 months out of the last 21 months.