Wednesday, February 18, 2009

Aha, DofF - and the PIIGS will fly...

This is from Bloomberg (here):

Credit-default swaps (CDS) on Irish government bonds climbed to 386 today from 378.5... Irish swaps last week surged 95 basis points... Contracts linked to French, German, U.K and Spanish debt also rose to all-time highs.

CDS, conceived to protect investors from default, pay the buyer face value in exchange for the underlying securities or the cash equivalent should a company fail to adhere to its debt agreements. An increase signals a deterioration in the perception of credit quality.

Ireland’s Finance Ministry said it’s incorrect to draw conclusions about the “soundness of Ireland’s public finances” from credit-default swaps.

“The credit default market is small and opaque,” the Dublin-based Ministry said in an e-mail today. “It is generally used as a speculative tool by a small number of market participants to gamble on movements in the CDS market itself rather than to insure against default.”

Oh, yes, and the DofF would know what they are talking about. After all, they do have on their staff:
  • no financial markets economists at a PhD level;
  • no financial risk economists at a PhD level;
  • no finance professionals at a PhD level;
  • no finance practitioners in fixed income with any reasonable senior private sector experience, and so on.
In fact, the DofF can't even forecast its the figures under its own remit. Forget making markets pricing statements.

But, hey, a good preemptive strike at the markets before things go further South is a way to go amongst Irish officials now days. And what a timely preemption this one was. The latest figures from CDS markets for inter-trading period show: 390-405 spreads. As B. puts it, "we are 50% up in a week, and its only Tuesday!"

And what about that ages-old deus ex machina of all incompetent polticians - the referencing to some
"small number of market participants" keen on speculating in the financial markets. Surely we've seen them being proved wrong before... many times... hmmm, like with the EMU crisis. It is clear that our DofF boffins are simply too economically illterate to understand that no small handful of speculators can win absent real arbitrage opportunities. Thus, if the small numbers of such speculators still exist in the market, there is something true to their gambles. In other words, there is no smoke without a fire. Dough!

Of course, it is not just the markets that are noticing Irish fairytale story of 12+% deficits and unbelievable DofF-cooked-up figures showing 3% deficit rule being met by 2013. Germans are noticing it too (see above mentioned Bloomberg report). And about time (see my comment to the WSJ blog here). What would Mrs Merkel have to say about the German taxpayers having to rescue our DofF from the clutches of the handful of market speculators?

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

Back from the snow

I am back in Dublin after a few days of snow-capped Italian Alps, great food, great wine, sunshine, crisp and clean mountains air. Friuli was, as it always is, a marvel!

What did I miss while away?

First, the recapitalization announced last week is not working. The magic, if a promise of the state taking a large chunk out of any future profitability, growth strategies and competitiveness of the Irish banks has had any magic in the first place, is now all gone. Gone because of the terms of this senile arrangement for all sides involved.
Here is how:
(1) The state is borrowing money at ca 5.5-5.7% in the market and injects money into the banks at 8%, earning risk unadjusted 2.5% return implying a risk-adjusted return (assuming our banks CDS spreads for last week) of ca -2-2.5%,
(2) The banks get money at 8%. Hostage to Government's demands on boards composition and lending, their profitability is shot for the foreseeable future,
(3) The banks are required to lend money out to businesses at... 8% (cost of funds) + admin cost (1.5%) so, say, ca 10% to repay the state,
(4) Businesses will stay away from this latest Government-engineered rip-off, while Ireland Inc's corporate and household balance sheets will still carry excessive levels of risk and debt and the economy will continue to spiral downward.
So, Minister Lenihan, the scheme cannot work even in theory. Forget about trying to make it work in practice.

Second, my favourite charts are updated to show that the things I missed while away were duly priced into Irish shares valuations by the market. Hey, at least the market still functions...

Third, I've missed some lively debates on certain 'academic' blogs about the pesky foreign commentators 'talking down' Irish Miracle Economy (and Government credit ratings). Needless to say, I am not amused:
(1) Some of those who made these comments themselves are keen on offering consultancy services advising foreign governments and commenting on their policies. Do their comments suggest that they claim a privilege to do what others should not be allowed?
(2) A part of this debate has finally exposed the undemocratic, technocratic nature of some of the members of the Irish intellectual elite. One commentator went as far as state that any publicly open debate exposes Ireland to the irrationality of the masses and that openness and freedom of expression thus are best reserved exclusively for discussions involving only 'informed' policymakers and analysts.

Which brings us to today's news: Irish 5-year CDS spreads have hit 378bps today, with a recovery rate of 40%, implying (assuming frictionless markets and no arbitrage) a lower bound of the Ireland Inc's default rate of 22%. Adding thinness of the markets (Irish bonds being traded in relatively small volumes, plus the half-day trading yesterday in the US) our implied sovereign default rate stands probably closer to 25%.

These are the resignable-level figures for our Brian-Brian-Mary Triumvirate of the Incompetents.

Tuesday, February 10, 2009

The end of the road?

Prepare for carnage once the markets open tomorrow. Per latest RTE report (here), Irish Life & Permanent admitted that it provided 'exceptional support' to Anglo Irish Bank following the taxpayers-paid-for Government [banks] Guarantee Scheme.

According to IL&P at the times of 'unprecedented turmoil' there was 'an acceptance that financial institutions would seek to provide each other with appropriate support where possible'. It is claimed that the transactions were fully and appropriately accounted for in the books and in regular reports to the Financial Regulator.

Anyone still surprised that the global markets are treating Irish equities as some sort of the corporate governance lepers? Any surprise that some institutional investors are no longer willing to hold any shares in the cozy cartel of 'supporters' that is Ireland Inc?

Here are some questions that must be asked immediately and with a view of taking up resolute corrective measures should any wrongdoing be uncovered:
  1. Can these actions by IL&P be interpreted as a deliberate manipulation of the market? Corporate deposits are the components of bank's balance sheet that support share price valuations. Interbank loans - a normal procedure - are not. If deposits were made to provide 'support' to the Anglo, without an immediate publication of these deposits and their underlying causes to the markets, did IL&P and Anglo collude to alter the bank's balance sheet without revelation of this price-sensitive information?
  2. Did IL&P deposits undermine own balance sheet and were they properly cleared through the risk-assessment process? Was IL&P shareholder value safeguarded in the process of making this gesture of camaraderie?
  3. If IL&P did disclose such deposits to the Financial Regulator, why these deposits were allowed to proceed and why this information was not made public immediately? If the FR knew about the covert nature of deposits, were they de facto a party to concealment of a price-sensitive information?
  4. We are all aware of the rumors that both the Guarantee Scheme and the Anglo's nationalization were carried out due to some critical events involving the Anglo and (in the case of the Guarantee) some other banks. Withdrawals of corporate deposits on a massive scale were rumored in late September and December 2008. Why is the Government unwilling to disclose the nature, the extent and the timing of these problems? After all, the Government is (largely rightly, I believe) using taxpayers money to shore up our financial system, committing tens of billions of our own and our children's funds to underpin the Guarantee, the nationalization and the bailouts.
  5. At an even deeper level: has there been an implicit (hear-no-evil, see-no-evil) or explicit (via refusal by the Government to admit the nature and extent of the triggers for emergency measures) collusion between the Government and the banking sector to sweep under the rug the problems of governance and management at some of our financial institutions?
Not a single revelation about the mis-conduct events associated with the Anglo has been made public by the Government in a voluntary fashion. Not a single piece of information concerning the due diligence process in re-capitalisation decisions by the State has been made public by the Government. In light of this it is legitimate to ask questions of the Government as to the nature of the silence that shrowds the taxpayers' bailout of the banaking sector.

Over recent days there has been a lot of talk in the international finance circles about the skeletons hidden in the closets of Irish banks. Reputational capital of Ireland Inc is no longer running thin - it is, by now, about as hole-ridden as a slice of Swiss cheese!

Functioning markets require compliance with the letter and the spirit of law. The law requires that all price-sensitive information relating to the publicly listed companies should be disclosed in a timely and appropriate manner. The IL&P-Anglo case suggests that, potentially:
  1. The law that supports functioning markets might have been severely breached; and
  2. Public safeguards that were entrusted to enforce this market-supporting law might have comprehensively failed.
If this is the case, it is time for heads to roll. Now! Starting at the top of the Financial Regulator's office and right through to the companies involved.

And as per re-capitalization scheme, any injection of public money must be preceded by a comprehensive independent (internationally-administered) review of the banks' balance sheets and books, prior to any State-financed repairs can be made.

Paul De Grauwe View: Credit Trouble Ireland

"Spreads of sovereign debt within the eurozone have increased dramatically during the last few months, largely as a result of panic in the financial markets. When it engages in quantitative easing, the ECB should privilege the buying of Irish, Greek, Spanish and Italian government bonds to eliminate the distortions and the externalities that these spreads create,"
says Paul De Grauwe in his yesterday's post on Vox - a worthy reading.

What this means is that, as predicted in my earlier posts, Ireland is now a prime candidate for an ECB-led rescue. De facto, De Grauwe's proposition implies Irish Government issuing (near-)worthless bonds and placing these with ECB in return for loans - a scenario that is indistinguisheable from an actual lender-of-last-resort rescue or equivalent to IMF lending money to Ukraine, Latvia, Hungary and Iceland.

De Grauwe offers a rather conventional - but not necessarilly wrong - view of the bond markets as being gripped by a speculative panic:
"My hypothesis is that the widening bond spreads within the eurozone are the result of panic in the financial markets. The panic that followed the banking crises has led investors into a stampede away from private debt into assets that are deemed safe. These are mainly government bonds of a few countries. The US, Germany, and possibly France are a few of these countries that, for some strange reason, have been singled out as supplying safety. Other countries do not profit from the same 'panic flight to safety'."

This statement prompted, yesterday, a rushed welcoming from a member of the officialdom of Irish ecnomics (see here). And yet, had Irish econocrats read through De Grauwe's article in full, they would have arrived at the following statement:
"Only Greece and Ireland saw their bond rates increase significantly over the last year, suggesting that the increased spreads of these countries are not only due to panic."

Needless to say - I agree with De Grauwe. Irish (and PIIGS in general) spreads are fundamentally linked not to those of the other Eurozone states but to the lack of national competitiveness (see De Grauwe's chart on unit labour costs reproduced below), economic diversification, cumulative wealth of society, infrastructural and human capital and indeed many other economic fundamentals which determine the resilience of economy in a downturn. In short - not a panic, but a low productivity of the PIIGS economies drives the crisis.

Relative unit labour costs in Eurozone
Source: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3009

In short, our econocrats, so keen on pumping public sector investment into building up Ireland's capital base, infrastructure, education etc somehow managed to convince themselves that our deficit in these areas, alongside our vast and widening Exchequer shortfall, uncontrollable public spending growth, massive banks guarantees and recapitalization commitments by the state and macroeconomic management that requires raising taxes during a severe recession, all matter little to the bonds markets. Instead, the panic - that deus ex machina of economics - is the answer.

No need to panic then...

Sunday, February 8, 2009

DofF Forecast: Update II

As promised - here are two scenarios estimating the state of the nation's finances.
The tables are based on DofF Update January 2009. Benign scenario assumes moderately deeper growth contraction (GDP), a fall-off in the tax receipts (as outlined in my previous update - in line with January 2009 Exchequer returns), a contraction in semi-state companies returns and my forecast for the 'savings' to be achieved in 2009-2013. All changes are marked in red. Blue color denotes differences in assumptions between moderate and benign scenarios, with moderate scenario assuming slightly deeper contractions in tax revenue, semi-states returns and shortfall in committed 'savings'.

Perhaps the most important lines to consider in both scenarios are lines: GEN GOV BALANCE and Gen Gov balance as % of GDP, which show that even under benign scenario, current dynamics in tax receipts and semi-states' revenue imply that Ireland will not be able to achieve Growth and Stability Pact limits on Governement deficit of 3% by 2013. The range for Gen Gov Balance Deficit is between €21bn and €22bn in 2009 - a far cry from the DofF forecast of €17.2bn.

Another important aspect of these estimates is the sensitivity of the general deficit to the assumption on 'savings' to be generated in 2009-2013. Given last week's fiasco with Mr Cowen's proposals, it is now absolutely clear to me that:
  • the cuts planned by the DofF for 2009-2013 are not going to materialise in full;
  • the cuts that will have a cumulative effect over the years forward are not going to cover the entire amounts planned, so that one-off-measures will play a significant role in total savings to be achieved.

Friday, February 6, 2009

Debt Mountain 'Ireland Inc' IV

Spot the odd one out...

Chart 1 shows the most indebted (in absolute terms - gross external debt volumes) nations of this world with their debts expressed as percentage of Ireland's gross external debt. This clearly ranks Ireland as the 9th most indebted nation in the world, and 6th in the Eurozone. Note that in absolute terms, Irish total debt is greater than that of Japan!Now, Chart 2 is even more revealing, as it plots per capita debt levels of the most indebted (in absolute terms) countries in the world. Ireland is a clear outlier!Massive, unpredictable and a (possible) danger to others... Is there something moving in the corner?

Thursday, February 5, 2009

Debt Mountain 'Ireland Inc' III

An anonymous reader asked in a comment to the previous post if I can provide any solutions to the problems we currently face in Irish economy.

It is a matter not to be taken lightly, but given time constraints - this has been an extremely busy week for me - here is an outline of what my thoughts are on this subject:

Policy 1: cut excessive public sector expenditure:
DofF projected budgeted expenditure to be in the region of €49bn and receipts in the region of €37.7bn. I forecast, based on the latest Exchequer results the latter to be no more than €33.6bn. My figures now imply (assuming that the €2bn savings factored in by DofF in January and announced this week will yield real savings of €1bn) a General Gov Balance of €23bn (or 12.1% of GDP) up from €17.98bn (or 9.5% of GDP) allowed for by DofF. Note - yes, you've read it right - GGB of €23bn for 2009!

Allowing for the deficit of 7% in 2009 implies Exchequer balance for 2009 of -€13.3bn and savings to be achieved of €9.7bn. Thus, my fiscal plan, inclusive of stimulus package finance (see below) would be to:
  • cut by 40% net capital budget expenditure - saving ca €3.3bn in 2009,
  • cut by 17% net current expenditure - savings ca €8.3bn in 2009.
To achieve the latter savings, I would suspend up to 75% of the overseas assistance, cut by 75% pre-funding for future pensions liabilities, roll back all public sector pensions indexation to 2006 level, carry out significant cuts in non-front-line personnel in health and education, public service and semi-state companies, and cut welfare payments by approximately 5%.

I would also move to privatise the remaining public assets, etc. Some of the cuts can come through a direct increase in the efficiency of public sector operations. For example, we can use existent IT and university facilities to increase the number of students attending each class, accommodating those who become unemployed and wish to pursue educational opportunities. This will save significant amounts on the Continued Education grants.

Policy 2: Stimulative measures for economy
1) Banks: I would use recapitalisation scheme to inject equity (stock options) into households' savings and draw down household debt - I've outlined such a scheme before. The real stimulative benefit of the planned €10bn recapitalization scheme will be (assuming 15% appreciation in banks shares to 2013 and a one-off 40% CGT on options at maturity) ca €2.2bn pa through 2013. Draw-downs in HHs debt (at 50cents per €1) will imply additional benefit of €1bn pa.
2) Taxation: I would finance through a surplus savings of ca €2bn on the expenditure side (see bullet points above) a tax cut in employer PRSI and expand investment tax credits for labour-intensive investments. I will also freeze local authorities charge and levies, review regulated price controls (energy, gas, water, public transport etc).

Long Range Reforms:
1) Local Authorities: drastic redrawing of the entire local governance structure in Ireland, reducing the number of local authorities to 4 or 5 (e.g GDA, South, North East & Midlands, West) with proportionate 40% reduction in personnel;
2) Property/Land Value Tax: to finance local authorities I would impose a land value tax to be computed on the value and size of the plot occupied by your dwelling. The tax will be phased in allowing for those who have paid stamp duty in recent years to obtain credit against the tax value. Stamp duty tax will be abolished.
3) Flat income tax: on all income, including corporate profits - to be set at a revenue-neutral rate (suggesting, for example a tax of ca 16% flat on all income in 2008 terms). I provided details of calculations and complexities involved in computing this tax years ago, but the core idea remains. If this implies raising our corporate tax a notch - so be it. There is absolutely no economic or moral reason as to why physical capital should be taxed at a different rate from human capital.
4) Balanced Budget & State Property Amendments: pass a constitutional amendment to ensure that the real growth in Government expenditure cannot exceed at any year (with exception of the national emergencies, of course) the real rate of growth in GNP less 1%. Pass a constitutional amendment barring the State from ever holding a stake (except in the cases of emergency, subject to a 2/3 majority vote in the Dail) in any commercial enterprise.
5) Spatial Development & Social Partnership: I will abandon all economic and social engineering projects that do not explicitly and directly involve a 2/3-majority vote in the Dail;
6) Anti-monopoly laws: I will strengthen the Competition Authority to reflect the powers of competition enforcing bodies in the UK and will require that no company in any sector be allowed to control more than 30% of the market share.

Sorry, guys & gals - we are in 1am territory and I have a busy day ahead. I will return to this topic in the future posts, but for now a call to arms - send me your ideas for reforms!

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Debt Mountain 'Ireland Inc' II

For those who missed yesterday's Irish Times article by Brian Lucey and myself - here is the link. Of course, the followers of this blog would know most of these facts already.

Another article - my quick analysis of the Exchequer figures for January - is in today's Irish Independent (here).

And I actually do mean we are in a soap-opera land when it comes to policy. In fact, in July, I wrote for an investment newsletter a piece that provided a metaphor for our public finances condition as of June 2008 - a metaphor of a Wile E. Coyote frozen over an abyss nanoseconds before a disaster. Memorably, I was informed that the metaphor was taking things too far... Hmmm... was it? Judge for yourselves:If you are still not feeling the wind whistling into your ears as Coyote gains speed, take a look at this...Two facts are apparent:
1) we are witnessing the steepest assent in the unemployment in years, with the speed of unemployment rise shown in the table below; and2) DofF forecast in January 2009 was for the economy to reach 9.2% unemployment this year. Just a month into 2009, we are already there in standardized unemployment terms. DofF 2010 target for social welfare spending is based on the projection that unemployment will reach 10.5% or a notch over 372,000 in today's labour force terms. 2009 Live Register average was assumed to be at 290,000 in the Budget. In other words, at the rate of jobs losses in January, we are less than 2 months away from blowing through 2010 assumption, never mind the 2009 estimate!

Whiiiishshsh! Goes Coyote...

2009 budgeting in October assumed unemployment at 7.3% 2009 (I wrote before about the abysmal quality of our boffins' forecasts here). The €2bn spending cuts were also based on this figure as a part of budgetary estimates. It is now crystal clear that DofF has grossly missed the estimate on social welfare and unemployment benefits. By how much? I will leave budgetary eggheads to do all the math, my guess is ca €2bn.

.... Splat!

But it can be more. Why? Well, last year an unknown, but potentially significant number of foreign workers have left Ireland. This undoubtedly kept Live Register somewhat lower. But as the best and most employable workers leave first - because they have better prospects of gaining a job elsewhere - adverse selection will most certainly see marginal and poor foreign workers remaining. These workers face much lower prospects of gaining a job elsewhere, so on the margin, Irish unemployment benefits are much more lucrative an incentive for them to stay here. In other words, if emigration was keeping Live Register below what it might have been in 2008, the same is unlikely to happen in 2009 and 2010.

Good luck to all who bought rental apartments in the outlying areas of Dublin and across the country. With Poles and others heading either for the airport or to the dole office, the rents are going to follow land values - into agricultural pricing territory...

P.S. Given that our banks spent 2008 busy converting development loans into investment loans by forcing developers to turn completed properties into rentals, what does this mean for our banks' impairment charges? BofI at €0.30 and AIB at €0.50 after the recapitalization?.. The answer is unpalatable, but I will leave the numbers as an exercise for Ireland's best banking sector analysts...

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Falling from disgrace

Ah, another day, another screw up in the Biffoland – the veritable emporium of economic policy oddities and quaint Boggerista collectibles. So much drama, RTE’s / ESRI’s tax-everyone-to-death crowd is getting all excited. In reality, if 2008 was the year Biffo & Co have fallen from grace, 2009 is shaping up to be the year when they will fall through the bottom of hell itself.

The 'savage cuts' were announced at last – ‘adding to just under €2.1bn’ in RTE’s official interpretation. In the mean time, the Exchequer results get sidelined by David Begg’s and Jack O’Connor’s pleading poverty for the public sector workers.

Let’s cut through the fog, shall we?

In the entire ‘package’ announced by Cowen the only hard budgetary measure was the pension levy. But even here, Mr Cowen fails the reality test. If the pensions levy is tax deductible – and all indications are that it is – the alleged €1.4bn in savings will shrink to ca €800mln.

The only announced economic rescue measure – some two-years old capital spending programme slightly neutered by the second-largest ‘cut’ of the day. But give it a second to take the perverse 'logic' of this Government's thinking in. If capital spending programme under the NDP is a stimulus package today - in the recession - what on earth was it enacted for some two years ago? To boost rabid inflation to Zimbabwean levels?

The rest of this 'new' package is pure hot air.

Cuts in professional fees and administrative savings?.. This beggars a question why these were not cut by Biffo when he was the Minister for Finance? So, either Biffo was an inept Minister for Finance (in which case he has some room to cut these lines of spending today) or he is an inept Taoiseach (in which case he has no room to cut these). Take your pick.

Child benefit restriction – aiming to save €75mln – is another hit at the same soft target. Remember Budget 2009 – children already got some whacking from our Biffo ‘The Gruffalo’. How much more can he milk out of them, should more ‘adjustments’ be needed in the near future (see below)? Lots! He can tax the un-born off-springs of the rich (income in excess, of oughh, say €150K pa) household.


But all of this pales in comparison with what should have been done by the Government in today’s announcement. As my earlier posts (here and here) estimate, in 2009 we are going to face “a shortfall of up to €7,080mln on 2008 revenue, not €3,898mln as DofF forecast in January. My previous post forecast €7,698mnl shortfall, so January figure appears to be generally supportive of this.”

The latest Exchequer results have just run over my correction – given the latest figures and the dynamic of different tax lines deterioration, we are now facing at the very least a ca €8bn shortfall on 2008 figures. Belatedly, some economists are coming to a realization that this indeed is the case (see here and scroll to Niall Says: February 3rd, 2009 at 7:50 pm comment). We are back to that original estimate of mine and things are likely to get even worse from here on, implying today's cuts should have been in the neigbourhood of €4-5bn!

In the end, Brian Cowen has loudly and publicly declared tonight that anyone expecting him to govern this economy out of the recession is a fool. He hasn’t got the balls, he hasn’t got the ideas and he hasn’t got the Cabinet to do the job. Full stop.

Someone, dial Trichet’s private secretary. We will need his money very soon!

P.S. Here is a problem no one noticed for now. If the basket cases Ireland, Greece and Italy are weighing heavily on the reputation of the Euro, then the lack of an immediate adverse reaction to today’s announcement by the bond markets might suggest that the Magnificent Three are now creating a drag on German bunds. In other words, Irish, Greek and Italian mess is now costing real money to German taxpayers through elevated spreads on the bund. I’d venture to say that Mrs Merkel might be a bit concerned about Brian’s economic flops.

Monday, February 2, 2009

S&P's visit: Pints!

S&P gang is in town (hat tip to P.O.) making rounds, sniffing out the need to slam the book on Irish bonds AAA rating. Better late than never, I'd say.

This blog has argued on numerous occasions (here and here) that Irish credit ratings should fall from their current AAA rating to at least AA-/A- levels. In fact, I called for S&P to climb down from its ivory tower of 'Ireland's low public debt...' myth and produce a more realistic assessment of the risks inherent in our borrowings (here).

This, of course, was predicated on:
  • Irish Government's exposure to toxic banks debt (here);
  • Irish Government's exposure to its own reckless spending (here);
  • Irish Government's inability to carry out necessary economic policy adjustments to address the real crises in this economy: corporate and household debt (here), and public sector excessive cost to the rest of the economy (here and here);
  • Irish Government's lack of realistic understanding of how economy works (here and here);
  • Irish Government's wobbling on various aspects of economic policy (see all the Mushroom Cloud posts in January 2008 archive)...
...and so on. I can go on listing more reasons as to why this is no longer an economy warranting a gold-standard AAA rating, but let me put three facts in front of you:

Fact 1: Despite having (belatedly) recognized the need for some sort of crisis management solutions in July 2008, the Government has yet to produce any realistic plan for dealing with the above problems.

Fact 2: Courtesy of FT (hat tip to B.) there is a self-explanatory chart below (corrected per Anonymous update, the number for Irish bank liabilities should be at 396% of GDP). Of course, those of you who are regular readers would recognize this as something I have written about ages ago (here), but FT's authority helps.
Fact 3: Finally, another chart illustrates the fact that no one in the market actually believes that our bonds offer AAA protection from default.
Pretty conclusive, then? So what's the point of sending a team over to Dubs, S&P? To have a few pints with our BB&M Trio and listen to their assurances that our 'greenish knowledge innovation' errr... economy-thingy is steaming ahead?

To the icebergs, then, Captain Brian!

PS: I am currently working on preparing a comprehensive compendium of comparisons per our debts (across various sectors and maturities) to the rest of the Eurozone, so keep watching the blog...

Sunday, February 1, 2009

DofF Forecast: Update I

According to today's reports, the y-o-y tax take in January is down 15% (hat tip to B.).

My personal projection, given the dynamics of 2008 tax intake (remember, Q1 2008 was still positive growth territory and lagged tax revenue was rolling in) is that we are going to finish 2009 with ca 15-17% down on 2008. 2007-2008 decline was 9.4%, implying we are going to collect €34,550-35,380mln in 2009 or a shortfall of up to €7,080mln on 2008 revenue, not €3,898mln as DofF forecast in January. My previous post forecast €7,698mnl shortfall, so January figure appears to be generally supportive of this.

As B. mentioned, this will bring our revenue to 2005 level - 'four years lost' as he puts it. This is about right - fundamentals (productivity, wages, costs inflation) all point to ireland having abandoned growth path around 2003-2004 which means a return - in nominal terms (using Eurozone average inflation rate) - to 2002-2003 levels by the end of 2011 will be mean reverting (with downward overshoot, of course) for underlying growth fundamentals.

P.S. Meanwhile - our Vacuum-Head in Politics Watch has spotted the following idea from Gay Mitchell (FG MEP). Surely, the nation falling off the cliff into an abyss of a severe recession and fiscal insolvency has nothing better to do than engage its MEPs in advocating Gaelic subtitles in cinemas. Too bad Gay's brain power never stretched to imagine watching a French or a German film with Irish and English subtitles littering the same screen. Oh, dear...

European v American Model: Labour and Leisure

Recently, I was invited to adjudicate TCD's Hist annual debate with Yale. It was, as such nights always are, a really great exchange of good-spirited fun and youthful energy. The topic of the debate was the clash of two values systems: the so-called American Model of economic development against the caring social-economy model this side of the Atlantic.

Great fun aside, neither Yale, nor TCD team produced much of earth shattering factual evidence to defend their arguments. Instead, several commonly held cliches, became the focal points fo the entire discourse.

One of these was the argument advanced by the TCD side that Americans enjoy lower quality of life than Europeans because the former work longer hours than the latter. It was frustrating watching the Yale team inventing epicycles to by-pass the thorny issue. In reality they did not have to do this, since the claim is simply not true.

Some years ago I worte about the matter in several articles (see an example here). But all comparisons between the quality of hours spent outside paid work enjoyed by Americans and Europeans are somewhat qualitative. 'Sure, maybe Americans do less own work at home, but what if Europeans actually enjoy house work?' goes an argument from the Eurofans side.

Ok, so Americans do indeed work longer hours than Europeans do. The question then becomes as to why these differences arise? Economics distinguishes two sources of greater aggregate hours worked in any economy:
  • the extensive margin - differences in hours worked due to differences in employment and labour force participation rates; and
  • the intensive margin - the number of hours worked per person employed.
A paper, published in November 2008 by the German Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA Discussion Paper No 3846, Langot, F. and C. Quintero-Rojas "European vs. American Hours Worked: Assessing the Role of the Extensive and Intensive Margins") shows very interesting results:
  • Concerning the impact of the extensive margin, the authors show that "the two dimensions of the extensive margin, the employment rate and the participation rate, explain the most of the total-hours-gap between regions. Moreover, both ratios have similar weight." In other words, Americans work longer hours than Europeans primarily because more Americans than Europeans are in employment and in the labour force. To say that Europeans 'enjoy' less work and more leisure is, according to this finding, equivalent to say that Europeans enjoy being unemployed and having no prospect of ever gaining a job in the future.
  • "Conversely," say the authors, "the intensive margin, measured by the number of hours worked per employee, has the smallest role."
The paper looks at data for Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, UK and US over 1960-2003. Here are few more details from their findings:

"We observe that in most countries the role of the intensive margin seems to be important before the mid 1970s" [which implies that American workers, on average, tended to work longer hours per person than their European counterparts not in the years of heartless Reganomics, but in the years of liberal Democrats - Kennedy, LBJ and Jimmy 'The Peanut' Carter].

"Thereafter, the contribution of the average hours per employee is very poor... In general, the two dimensions of the extensive margin have a minor impact before the 1970s. Thereafter, in all countries the relevance of the three variables is quite similar."
[This shows that consigned to long term unemployment, Europeans are working less since the onset of the 1980s - precisely when Europe decided to depart from the 'American' model of flexible labour markets in favour of the socialist/welfare state model of employment].

And so, "about 2/3 of the observed fall in the total hours of market work in European countries, relative to the US, is mostly explained by the dynamics of the extensive margin (that is, by the employment and the participation), and roughly 1/3 by the dynamics of the intensive margin (the hours worked per employee), particularly after the 1980s."

I rest my case...