Showing posts with label Growth crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Growth crisis. Show all posts

Thursday, October 9, 2014

9/10/2014: IMF Lagarde: We Are Out of Ideas, You Are Out of Convictions


In several recent posts, I have highlighted the fact that the IMF - that stalwart of global 'structural' reforms - has now effectively exhausted its toolkit of ideas as to how we can get global growth back on track. And the governments around the advanced economies world are now equally out of conviction to deploy the IMF's old toolkit.

This is evident across the board: from the Fund latest World Economic Outlook update which keeps endlessly banging on about the need for

  • Accommodative monetary policies and, simultaneously, de-risking of the financial economy (the two tasks that actually contradict each other, as IMF own GFSR report admits);
  • Structural markets reforms (which in the IMFspeak means preciously little more than more reforms of the labour markets, or in distilled terms: more 'activation' efforts to bring the unemployed to still inexistent jobs and push welfare recipients off the dole into still inexistent jobs);
  • Credit supply restoration in the economy amidst continued banks deleveraging (which basically means that the banks need to get rid of old - presumably bad risk - loans while increasing their stock of new - presumably better risk - loans);
  • Creation of better, more robust risk management frameworks in banking while increasing banking sector concentration (the outcome of the deleveraging process) and increasing risks concentrations by creating more centralised controls and supervision (e.g. the European Banking Union); and so on.

All of the above 'reforms' are clearly self-contradictory in so far as achieving one side of the objective implies undermining the other side.

And with today's release, we have a veritable Map to the Middle-Earth from the Fund's own Christine Lagarde. In today's "The Managing Director's Global Policy Agenda" Ms. Lagarde is navel gazing over 14 pages of text, charts and slides under the sub-heading of "Aiming Higher, Trying Harder". You get the sense of frustration of the Fund stuff with the intransigent Governments unwilling to deploy all of the medicines prescribed to them by the Fund, but you also get a feeling for the out-of-touch banality of the IMF's approach to the crisis.

Take the preamble. "Bold and resolutely executed policies are needed to prevent growth from settling into a “new mediocre,” with unacceptably low job creation and inclusion. Measures should emphasize":

  • "Lifting growth. Decisive structural reforms are needed to bolster confidence and lift today’s actual and tomorrow’s potential growth and break the pattern of persistent underperformance and insufficient job-creation. Accommodative monetary policies should continue to support demand and provide breathing space as these reforms are implemented. But it is essential that they are accompanied by macro-critical reforms that remove deep-seated distortions in labor and product markets; improve credit flows to productive sectors; strengthen growth-friendly fiscal frameworks; and eliminate infrastructure gaps." You get a sense that this has been said before, argued many times over and offers nothing new. In effect, the IMF is saying: spend more, cut spending more, re-spend more; and fund it all by printing presses, while making sure the rag-tag of the real economy (SMEs and households) don't get their hands on the printed cash.
  • "Building resilience. Easy money continues to increase market and liquidity risks, especially in the shadow banking sector, potentially compromising financial stability. Appropriate regulation and vigilant financial sector supervision, including developing and deploying macro-prudential tools, can help limit excessive financial risk-taking. Preparations for less benign financial conditions also need to be stepped-up. As monetary policy normalization approaches in some major economies, stronger policy frameworks, institutions, and economic fundamentals can mitigate potentially adverse spillovers." But, dear IMF, who creates this 'easy money'? And for who the money is 'easy'? The answer is in the first point above: printing presses do create 'easy money' and Governments and larger banks get 'easy money'. So de facto, IMF advice 1 and 2, taken together mean that creating growth + building resilience to risk = growing the share of Government and big banks in the economy. That should really keep troubles at bay, especially since the current crisis is caused by… yep, you've guessed it, rising role of Governments and big banks in the economy. Apparently, what can't kill you makes you stronger.
  • And then there is IMF advice that IMF should learn to follow itself: "Achieving coherence. International cooperation is needed to amplify the benefits from these bold policies and to avoid exacerbating existing distortions, particularly regarding financial stability and global imbalances. Dialogue and policy cooperation can help smoothly rebalance global demand; minimize adverse spillovers and spillbacks from asynchronous monetary unwinding; ensure consistent financial regulation; and maintain an adequate global financial safety net. Fresh momentum must be injected into the global trade dialogue." Where did we hear that? Ah, yes, right - we've heard in Greece (when the IMF quietly stood by as the EU rained chaos onto Greek and Cypriot financial systems and Exchequers by refusing to get Public Sector Participation - or restructuring - going); and we heard it in Ireland (where the IMF stood idly by as the Irish Governments and European partners loaded some EUR70 billion-plus worth of banks debts onto the real economy and then destroyed entire sectors of the economy in the name of Nama-lution); and in Italy (where IMF is still refusing to acknowledge the need for sovereign debt restructuring).


Do not forget that the IMF team has run out of Athens this week in a hissy - the most heavily 'repaired' economy in the world seems to be going off-the-rails again.

Here is the road map for advanced economies as traced by the IMF:



As we have it: in Euro Area the achievements were: 1) 'good progress' on monetary easing (the printing press) but more to be done; 2) 'some progress' on consolidating the banking system eggs in one regulatory basket (and more to be done); 3) basically no fiscal reforms; and 4) no reforms on taxation, no improvement in competition across both labour and product markets (not to mention decline in competition in financial economy).

Are we still talking, Ms Lagarde? Oh yes…

Let's take a look at the first pillar of IMF 'wisdom': the printing press. Here's Fund own assessments of the outcomes: "Despite massive and welcome monetary support in major advanced economies and slowing fiscal consolidation, the recovery remains uneven and sluggish. Growth, and hence policy advice, are increasingly divergent across countries. Inflation is still below target in many advanced economies and is a growing concern in the euro area, while unemployment has stayed high. … The envisaged acceleration in economic activity has again failed to materialize."

So just as with Krugmanomics, the IMFology calls for more printing, cause previous rounds weren't enough: "Growth prospects in advanced economies are expected to remain uneven across regions. The strongest growth rebound is expected in the United States, while growth in Japan will remain modest. The crisis legacy brakes (including high private and public debt) are expected to only gradually ease in the euro area, while inflation expectations continue to drift down and deflationary risks are rising. Growth elsewhere, including other Asian advanced economies, Canada, and the United Kingdom, is projected to be solid."

And with all of those 'structural reforms' - do we have an uplift in at least potential (if not actual) output? Nope: "Growth potential may be lower than earlier assumed… Increasing evidence suggests that potential growth started to decline in advanced economies even before the onset of the crisis—which may be affecting the current pace of recovery. The recent slowdown in EMEs also has a large structural component, raising questions about the sustainability of growth rates achieved prior to the crisis and during the 2010–11 rebound."



So here are two road maps side by side: one for Spring 2014 and another for Fall 2014… and, save for gentle re-phrasing of the same, the two are largely identical when it comes to the advanced economies.



So spend more on infrastructure as opposed to reduce debt overhang... and that will be funded by what? Pears and apples?

Out of new ideas. QED.

Sunday, March 9, 2014

9/3/2014: Financial Repression, Debt Crises & Debt Restructuring: R&R Strike Again


According to Reinhart and Rogoff recent (December 2013) paper "Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten" (by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, IMF Working Paper WP/13/266, December 2013 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13266.pdf) many economies in the advanced world will require defaults, as well as drastic measures of Financial Repression, including savings taxes and higher inflation as debt levels reach a 200-year high.

You can read the entire paper, so I am just going to summarise some core points, albeit at length.


R&R open up with a statement that is more of a warning against our complacency than a claim of our arrogance: "Even after one of the most severe crises on record (in its fifth year as of 2012) in the advanced world, the received wisdom in policy circles clings to the notion that advanced, wealthy economies are completely different animals from their emerging market counterparts. Until 2007–08, the presumption was that they were not nearly as vulnerable to financial crises. When events disabused the world of that notion, the idea still persisted that if a financial crisis does occur, advanced countries are much better at managing the aftermath..."

This worldview is also not holding, according to R&R: "Even as the recovery consistently proved to be far weaker than most forecasters were expecting, policymakers continued to underestimate the depth and duration of the downturn."

The focal point of this delusional thinking is Europe, "…where the financial crisis transformed into sovereign debt crises in several countries, the current phase of the denial cycle is marked by an official policy approach predicated on the assumption that normal growth can be restored through a mix of austerity, forbearance, and growth."

The point is that European (and other advanced economies' policymakers are deceiving the public (and themselves), believing that they "…do not need to apply the standard toolkit used by emerging markets, including debt restructurings, higher inflation, capital controls, and significant financial repression. Advanced countries do not resort to such gimmicks, policymakers say. To do so would be to give up hard-earned credibility, thereby destabilizing expectations and throwing the economy into a vicious circle."

Note: per R&R "“Financial repression” includes directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements, and generally a tighter connection between government and banks. It often masks a subtle type of debt restructuring."

The warning that stems from the above is that "It is certainly true that policymakers need to manage public expectations. However, by consistently choosing instruments and calibrating responses based on overly optimistic medium-term scenarios, they risk ultimately losing credibility and destabilizing expectations rather than the reverse."

It is worth noting as a separate point in addition to the above issues that:

  1. Financial repression in its traditional means (forcing public debt into investment portfolio of captive funds, such as pension funds, reducing real returns on savings, tax on savings, bail-ins of private investors etc) in the case of the advanced economies are running against demographic changes, such as ageing of these societies. Just as the economies reliance on savings and pensions rises, financial repression is cutting into the economies savings and pensions.
  2. Higher inflation is associated with higher interest rates in the longer term, which can have a devastating impact on debt-burdened households. Hence, deleveraging of the sovereigns cuts against the objective of deleveraging the real economy (households and companies). This is most pronounced in the case of countries like Ireland.
  3. Strong point from R&R on austerity. In many cases, advanced economies debate about austerity is 0:1 - either 'do austerity' or 'do expansionary fiscal policy'. This is superficial. Per R&R: "Although austerity in varying degrees is necessary, in many cases it is not sufficient to cope with the sheer magnitude of public and private debt overhangs."


So the key lessons from the past are as follows.

Lesson 1: "On prevention versus crisis management. We have done better at the latter than the former. It is doubtful that this will change as memories of the crisis fade and financial market participants and their regulators become complacent."

Figure 1. Varieties of Crises: World Aggregate, 1900–2010
A composite index of banking, currency, sovereign default, and inflation crises (BCDI), and stock market crashes (BCDI+stock) (weighted by their share of world income)


Lesson 2: "On diagnosing and understanding the scope and depth of the risks and magnitudes of the debt. What is public and what is private? Domestic and external debt are not created equal. And debt is usually MUCH bigger than what meets the eye."

R&R are not shying away from the bold statements (in my view - completely warranted): "The magnitude of the overall debt problem facing advanced economies today is difficult to overstate. The mix of an aging society, an expanding social welfare state, and stagnant population growth would be difficult in the best of circumstances. This burden has been significantly compounded by huge increases in government debt in the wake of the crisis, illustrated in Figure 2. …As the figure illustrates, the emerging markets actually deleveraged in the decade before the financial crisis, whereas advanced economies hit a peak not seen since the end of World War II. In fact, going back to 1800, the current level of central government debt in advanced economies is approaching a two-century high-water mark."

Figure 2. Gross Central Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP: Advanced and Emerging Market Economies, 1900–2011 (unweighted average)

Things are even worse when it comes to external debt, as Figure 3 illustrates.

Figure 3. Gross Total (Public plus Private) External Debt as a Percentage of GDP: 22 advanced and 25 Emerging Market Economies, 1970–2011

Note the 'exponential' trend on the chart above since the 1990s...

This is non-trivial (as per Figure 2 conclusions). "The distinction between external debt and domestic debt can be quite important. Domestic debt issued in domestic currency typically offers a far wider range of partial default options than does foreign currency–denominated external debt. Financial repression has already been mentioned; governments can stuff debt into local pension funds and insurance companies, forcing them through regulation to accept far lower rates of return than they might otherwise demand. But domestic debt can also be reduced through inflation."

And, as Figure 4 illustrates, public and external debts overhang are just the beginning of the troubles: "the explosion of private sector debt before the financial crisis. Unlike central government debt, for which the series are remarkably stationary over a two-century period, private sector debt shows a marked upward trend due to financial innovation and globalization, punctuated by volatility caused by periods of financial repression and financial liberalization."

Figure 4. Private Domestic Credit as a Percentage of GDP, 1950–2011 (22 Advanced and 28 Emerging Market Economies)


Lesson 3: "Crisis resolution. How different are advanced economies and emerging markets? Not as different as is widely believed."

R&R (2013) show "five ways to reduce large debt-to-GDP ratios (Box1). Most historical episodes have involved some combination of these."



As R&R note, "the first on the list is relatively rare and the rest are difficult and unpopular." But more ominously, "recent policy discussion has tended to forget options (3) and (5), arguing that advanced countries do not behave that way. In fact, option (5) was used extensively by advanced countries to deal with post–World War II debt (Reinhart and Sbrancia, 2011) and option (3) was common enough before World War II."

Beyond the fact that the two measures have precedent in modern history of the advanced economies, there is also the issue of the current crisis being of greater magnitude than previous ones.

"Given the magnitude of today’s debt and the likelihood of a sustained period of sub-par average growth, it is doubtful that fiscal austerity will be sufficient, even combined with financial repression. Rather, the size of the problem suggests that restructurings will be needed, particularly, for example, in the periphery of Europe, far beyond anything discussed in public to this point. Of course, mutualization of euro country debt effectively uses northern country taxpayer resources to bail out the periphery and reduces the need for restructuring. But the size of the overall problem is such that mutualization could potentially result in continuing slow growth or even recession in the core countries, magnifying their own already challenging sustainability problems for debt and old age benefit programs."


The authors conclude that "…if policymakers are fortunate, economic growth will provide a soft exit, reducing or eliminating the need for painful restructuring, repression, or inflation. But the evidence on debt overhangs is not heartening. Looking just at the public debt overhang, and not
taking into account old-age support programs, the picture is not encouraging. Reinhart, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2012) consider 26 episodes in which advanced country debt exceeded 90 percent of GDP, encompassing most or all of the episodes since World War II. (They tabulate the small number of cases in which the debt overhang lasted less than five years, but do not include these in their overhang calculations.) They find that debt overhang episodes averaged 1.2 percent lower growth than individual country averages for non-overhang periods. Moreover, the average duration of the overhang episodes is 23 years. Of course, there are many other factors that determine longer-term GDP growth, including especially the rate of productivity growth. But given that official public debt is only one piece of the larger debt overhang issue, it is clear that governments should be careful in their assumption that growth alone will be able to end the crisis. Instead, today’s advanced country governments may have to look increasingly to the approaches that have long been associated with emerging markets, and that advanced countries themselves once practiced not so long ago."


What R&R are showing in their paper is that Financial Repression already underway is hardly inconsistent with the potential for further restructuring and repression. They also show that the current crisis is still unresolved and ongoing and that the current de-acceleration in crisis dynamics is not necessarily a sign of sustained recovery: things are much longer term than 1-2 years of growth can correct for. In the mean time, as we know, the EU continues on the path of shifting more and more future crisis liabilities onto the shoulders of savers and investors, while offloading more and more public debt overhang costs onto the shoulders of taxpayers. All along, the media and our politicians keep talking down the risks of future bailouts, bail-ins and structural pain (lower growth rates, higher interest rates, higher rates of private insolvencies).


Note: You can read more on the rather lively debate about the effects of debt on growth by searching this blog for "Reinhart & Rogoff" Some of the links are here:


Sunday, December 22, 2013

22/12/2013: Most Important Charts of the Year: via BusinessInsider


A new set of The Most Important Charts from BusinessInsider.com is out, this time covering the full year:
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-important-charts-2013-12

My contribution is here: http://www.businessinsider.com/most-important-charts-2013-12#constantin-gurdgiev-trinity-college-dublin-85

The full chart:


Note: 2013 marks the fifth consecutive year of the European growth crisis. Amidst the recent firming up in global conditions, it is important to remember that per capita GDP (in US Dollar terms) in both the euro area and the UK remains below the pre-crisis peaks. In absolute terms, euro area cumulated 2008-2013 losses in GDP per capita range from EUR 1,311 for Malta to EUR 56,496 for Ireland, with the euro area average losses of EUR 20,318. No advanced economy within the EU27 has managed to recover cumulative losses  in GDP per capita to-date. On average, euro area GDP per capita in 2013 is forecast to be 9.7% lower than pre-crisis. Across other advanced economies, the GDP per capita is expected to be 8.4% higher in 2013. While this makes the euro area a strong candidate for growth in 2014-2015, absent apparent catalysts for longer term gains in value added, and TFP and labour productivity expansion, a European recovery can be a short-lived bounce-back, rather than a dawn of a New Age.

Sources: Author own calculations based on IMF data.

There is an earlier version of the same chart I prepared, covering also the duration of the crisis and its extent using as a metric GDP per capita in constant prices in national currency (not USD):



Friday, November 22, 2013

22/11/2013: German GDP - no surprise to the downside

German GDP figures out: Q2 2013 confirmed at +0.7% q/q, Q3 2013 final at 0.3% q/q. Year-on-Year Q3 2013 at +1.1%, exports up only +0.1% q/q, imports up +0.8% q/q.

A chart (via @moved_average):


And the chart lesson? Recovery period: 2010-to-date: Trend growth down-sloping, volatility consistent with 2002-2007 period. The latest recovery sub-period - unconvincing.

More on euro area growth: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2013/11/20112013-euro-area-zaporozhetz-of-growth.html

Monday, July 8, 2013

8/7/2013: IMF on Euro Area: Repetition in the Endless Unlearning of Reality

IMF released its statement on 2013 Article IV Consultation with the Euro Area

The Statement reads (emphasis mine):
"Policy actions over the past year have addressed important tail risks and stabilized financial markets. But growth remains weak and unemployment is at a record high."

So what needs to be done, you might ask? Oh, nothing new, really. Euro area needs:
-- To take "concerted policy actions to restore financial sector health and complete the banking union". Wait… err… this was not planned to-date? Really?
-- "continued demand support in the near term and deeper structural reforms throughout the euro area remain instrumental to raise growth and create jobs". In other words: find some dish to spend on stuff and hope this will do the trick on short-term growth. Reform thereafter.

Not exactly encouraging? How about this: "…the centrifugal forces across the euro area remain serious and are pulling down growth everywhere. Financial markets are still fragmented along national borders and the cost of borrowing for the private sector is high in the periphery, particularly for smaller enterprises. Ailing banks continue to hold back the flow of credit." So the solution is - more credit? Now, what did we call credit in old days? Right… debt, so: "In the face of high private debt and continued uncertainty, households and firms are postponing spending—previously, this was mainly a problem of the periphery but uncertainty over the adequacy and timing of the policy response is now making itself felt in falling demand in the core as well." Wait a second, now: more credit… err… debt will solve the problem, but the problem is too much debt… err… credit from the past…

Ok, from IMF own publication earlier this year, what happens when credit - debt - is let loose:

Source: http://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2013/03/05/a-missing-piece-in-europes-growth-puzzle/


Just in case you need more of this absurdity: "…reviving growth and employment is imperative. This requires actions on multiple fronts—repairing banks’ balance sheets, making further progress on banking union, supporting demand, and advancing structural reforms. These actions would be mutually reinforcing: measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors, which in turn would help restore competitiveness and raise growth in these economies. A piecemeal approach, on the other hand, could further undermine confidence and leave the euro area vulnerable to renewed stress." Oh, well, 5 years ago we needed

  1. 'actions on repairing banks balance sheets' - five years later, we still need them;
  2. actions on 'supporting demand' - aka, no tax increases and some investment stimulus - five years on, we still need them;
  3. actions on 'advancing structural reforms' and five years on, we still need them too;
  4. "measures to improve credit conditions in the periphery would boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors" - wait a second ten years ago we had easy credit conditions in the periphery and they failed comprehensively to 'boost investment and job creation in new productive sectors', having gone instead to fuel property and public spending bubbles… five years since the start of the crisis, we now should expect a sudden change in the economies response to easier credit supply?


IMF is more sound on banks: "bank losses need to be fully recognized, frail but viable banks recapitalized, and non-viable banks closed or restructured". But, five years, bank losses needed to be fully recognised too and we are still waiting. And when it comes to closing or restructuring non-viable banks, pardon me, but where was the IMF in the case of Ireland when the country was forced by the ECB to underwrite non-viable banks with taxpayers funds?

"A credible assessment of bank balance sheets is necessary to lift confidence in the euro area financial system." Ok, we had three assessments of euro area banks - none credible and all highly questionable in outcomes. Five years in, we are still waiting for an honest, open, transparent assessment.

Cutting past the complete waffle on the banking union and ESM, "The ECB could build on existing instruments—such as a new LTRO of longer tenor coupled with a review of current collateral policies, particularly on loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SME)—or undertake a targeted LTRO specifically linked to new SME lending." Ooops, I have been saying for years now that the ECB should create a long-term funding pool for most distressed banks, stretching 10-15 years. Five years into the crisis - still waiting.


On structural reforms, IMF is going now broader and further than before and I like their migration:

"For the euro area, …a targeted implementation of the Services Directive would remove barriers to protected professions, promote cross-border competition, and, ultimately, raise productivity and incomes. A new round of free trade agreements could provide a much-needed push to improve services productivity. In addition, further support for credit and investment could be achieved through EIB facilities. The securitization schemes proposed by the European Commission and the European Investment Bank could also underpin SME lending and capital market development." Do note that the last two proposals are still about debt generation (see above).

"At the national level, labor market rigidities [same-old] should be tackled to raise participation, address duality—which disproportionally hurts younger workers—and, where necessary, promote more flexible bargaining arrangements. At the same time, lowering regulatory barriers to entry and exit of firms and tackling vested interests in the product markets throughout the euro area would support competitiveness, as it would deliver a shift of resources to export sectors [ok, awkwardly put, but pretty much on the money. Except, greatest protectionism in the EU is accorded to banks and famers, and these require first and foremost restructuring]."

In short - little new imagination, loads of old statements replays and little irony in recognising that much of this has been said before… five years before, four years before, three years before, two years before, a year before… you get my point.