Showing posts with label Governance. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Governance. Show all posts

Monday, April 26, 2021

25/4/21: Impact of foreign shareholders on the performance of the Chinese banks

 A new paper (pre-print version): Gurdgiev, Constantin, and Jiagi, Li, The Journey of a thousand miles: a decade of impact of foreign shareholders on the performance of the Chinese commercial banks (April 25, 2021). Handbook of Banking and Finance in Emerging Markets, eds. D. K. Nguyen, Edward Elgar Publishing, August 2021, forthcoming., Available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3834020. 

Abstract: 

We analyze the impact of foreign shareholdings on the performance of 28 Chinese commercial banks over a period of 2010-2019, capturing the period prior to and following the reforms of 2014. Using panel data GMM with instrumental variables, we consider bank performance from three perspectives: profitability, quality of assets and liquidity. The individual performance indicators are return on equity (ROE), non-performing loan (NPL) ratio, loan-to-deposit ratio, and loan loss coverage ratio. We find that foreign shareholdings have a significant negative impact on ROE. Increase in foreign investment is coincident with growth in the size of Chinese commercial banks in terms of assets that is faster than the increases in the banks’ return on capital. These findings are intuitively justified: if foreign investors increase banks’ appetite for growth, growth in assets under management will tend to outpace growth in returns on assets in the earlier stages of new investments. From the quality perspective, we show that banks’ NPL ratio is negatively correlated with foreign shareholdings and the correlation is significant both statistically and empirically. NPL ratios fall in the banks with more foreign participation. This result stands contrasted by the fact that some foreign investors (activist and hedge funds), seek to invest in Chinese listed banks with higher NPLs. In terms of liquidity performance, foreign share ownership has a significant negative influence on banks’ loan-to-deposit ratio. Loan loss coverage ratio significantly increases, along with the increasing foreign participation in Chinese commercial banks shareholdings. Combined, these effects suggest significant positive twin effect of foreign shareholdings on Chinese commercial banks risk profiles. As the result, Chinese banks with higher foreign shareholdings are better prepared to sustain losses from bad loans and state risks and have lower risk exposures to bad loans. The combined effects of our findings strongly suggest that Chinese banks’ ROE can be expected to pick up in the near future with further financial opening in the sector and the greater involvement of foreign investors that comes along with it.



Friday, April 23, 2021

23/4/21: There are no 'social' winners amidst this pandemic

 

No one is left unscarred by the #covid19 pandemic when it comes to public approval trends for the major social stakeholders in Ireland: 

Source: Core Research. 

Broadly-speaking, the above is expected, although Core Research report contains one glaring omission: it does not survey public attitudes to media/press. Worse, the three improving stakeholder groups are also the three least impacted: own employer, citizens and large companies. Meanwhile, approval of the government is still nosediving. 

Covid pandemic is certainly testing Irish (and other countries') key institutional frameworks. The fallout from these tests is going to be long-lasting and deep. We went into the pandemic with huge deficits of trust in key institutions of our societies. And we are becoming more polarized and less enthusiastic in our support for these institutions since then.

Saturday, December 14, 2019

14/12/19: Governance and Government Debt


What I am reading this week: a new paper via EFMA, titled "Governance and Government Debt" by João Imaginário and Maria João Guedes, available here: https://efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2019-Azores/papers/EFMA2019_0184_fullpaper.pdf.

The paper looks at "the relationship between Worldwide Governance Indicators [a proxy for governance quality] and Government Debt in 164 countries for the period between 2002 and 2015." Using fixed effects (FE) and generalized method of moments (GMM) models the authors show that "governance quality is negatively and statistically related with government debt. For Low Income countries was found evidence that better governance environment is associated with lower public debt levels."

More specifically, "for a set of 164 countries on a period between 2002 and 2015, ... estimation results for FE model suggest that Control of Corruption (CC) and Voice and Accountability (VA) indexes are negative and statistically significant on influencing government debt. In part, this result confirms our Hypothesis 1 that better governance quality is associated with lower levels of public
debt." But the study also shows that these 'global' effects are predominantly driven by the presence of low income countries in the full sample. The authors find that "the link between good governance quality and government debt reduction is more evident for Low Income countries."

As a caveat, the authors do find that overall higher score in the World Governance Indicators Index (as opposed to specific sub scores) has a negative and statistically significant impact on the levels of government debt, so that overall higher measure of governance quality is associated with lower government debt for the High Income economies. The magnitude of this effect was reasonably large, as well.

Thursday, January 12, 2017

11/1/17: Mr. Trump's Plan for Addressing Conflicts of Interest is a Fig Leaf of Corporate Governance


Why PEOTUS Donal Trump’s plan to donate hotels profits earned from foreign government payments to the U.S. Treasury is a fig leaf of corporate governance measures?

Photo credit: GettyImages

There are several reasons why a commitment to donate profits arising from foreign governments' payments to his hotels will not reduce, nor even alleviate, business incentives for potential conflict of interest that may arise in the future.

Firstly, donating profits from such activities requires that profits are declared on these activities in the first place. Since profits are declared across the entire business, not on the basis of individual transactions, Mr. Trump can use full extent of tax laws and accounting procedures, including cumulated losses deductions and tax shields on investment, to effectively reduce such denotable profits to nil over the next 4-8 years. 

Secondly, profits are not the most important financial line on which Mr. Trump operates. Mr. Trump operates on the basis of business (net) worth (value of his business) which reflects not so much the declared profits, but rather the earnings generated by his businesses (cash flow basis, e.g. EBITDA) and also reflects earnings over the longer term time horizon (timing factor). 

Now, consider the following hypothetical scenario: suppose Mr. Trump’s hotels receive USD1 million in foreign government’s bookings in 2017. Suppose he earns 10 percent profit margin on these earnings (so we neglect the issue raised in the first argument above). The profit is declared and Mr. Trump donates USD100K to the U.S. Treasury in 2017. The problem is that the 10% profit margin is across the entire group of hotels, not across the individual rooms and services supplied in exchange for the USD1 million foreign Governments' payments. As the result, 10% margin reflects costs and investments undertaken by the whole group. Foreign earnings, therefore, can be used to fund internal investment activities, ammortization and capital replacement costs, hiring costs, new services deployments etc. All of which will increase the value of Mr. Trump's hotels, including hotels that did not collect foreign payments.

In the mean time, Mr. Trump's business earnings did increase in 2017 by USD1 million as the result of the assumed foreign governments' payments. If this increase is viewed as organic or permanent, rather than a one-off windfall, his business value will increase as the result of these 2017 earnings even independent of the aforementioned investment. Why? Because companies are valued on the basis of their cash flow. Not on the basis of declared profits.

Furthermore, foreign governments' paid earnings will increase Mr. Triump's businesses capacity to borrow and raise equity. These increased borrowings and equity raises can further be used to invest in new business capital. This too will enhance business valuations for Mr. Trump.

In simple terms, even after donating his profits, Mr. Trump will be able to still gain substantially from increased revenues paid for by foreign governments. 

Thirdly, there is a host of other implications relating to Mr. Trump’s plan. 
  1. It will be hard to account for all payments by ‘foreign governments’ because many such payments can come via private foreign and even domestic companies, foreign organisations and foreign individuals, or for that matter, via domestic agents and agencies acting on behalf of these foreign governments. 
  2. How will the donations to Treasury be treated under the U.S. tax laws is material as well. If these are treated as charitable donations, they can be tax deductible, creating a tax shield for Mr. Trump. This tax shield can be extremely valuable, especially if his businesses use foreign-funded earnings to borrow for investment (effectively transferring these payments into future interest-related tax benefits). 
  3. Mr. Trump announced today that his companies will not be permitted to make any new foreign deals during his presidency tenure. However, domestic deals will be allowed. The problem is that this does not preclude use of foreign governments’ payments/earnings for the purpose of reinvestment in the U.S. Which cycles us back to the argument that these payments can still be used to enhance Mr. Trump’s business valuations.

In simple terms, Mr. Trump’s plan to prevent conflicts of interest arising does not add up to reducing incentives for conflict of interest. It is a fig leaf of corporate governance.


Saturday, June 18, 2016

18/7/16: Gamed Financial Information and Regulation Misfires


A recent interview by the Insights by Stanford Business, titled “In Financial Disclosures, Not All Information Is Equal” (all references are supplied below and all emphasis in quotations is mine) touched upon a pivotal issue of quality of information available from public disclosures by listed companies - the very heart of the market fundamentals.

The interview is with Stanford professor of accounting Iván Marinovic, who states, in the words of the interviewer, that “financial statements are becoming less and less relevant compared to other sources of information, such as analysts and news outlets. ...there is a creeping trend in financial disclosures away from the reliance on verifiable assets and toward more intangible elements of a business’s operations.”

In simple terms, financial information is being gamed. It is being gamed by increasing concentration in disclosures on ‘soft’ information (information that cannot be verified) at the expense of hard information disclosures (information that can be verified). More parodoxically, increasing gaming of information is a result, in part, of increasing requirements to disclose hard information! Boom!


Let's elaborate.

In a recently published (see references below) paper, Marinovic and his co-author, Jeremy Bertomeu define ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ information slightly differently. “The coexistence of hard and soft information is a fundamental characteristic of the measurement process. A disclosure can be soft, in the form of a measure that “can easily be pushed in one direction or another”, or hard, having been subjected to a verification after which “it is difficult to disagree”."

For example, firms asset classes can range "from tangible assets to traded securities which are subject to a formal verification procedure. Forward-looking assets are more difficult to objectively verify and are typically regarded as being soft. For example, the value of many intangibles (e.g., goodwill, patents, and brands) may require unverifiable estimates of future risks.”

The problem is that ‘soft’ information is becoming the focus of corporate reporting because of coincident increase in hard information reporting. And worse, unmentioned in the article, that ‘soft’ information is now also a matter of corporate taxation systems (e.g. Ireland’s ‘Knowledge Development Box’ tax scheme). In other words, gamable metrics are now throughly polluting markets information flows, taxation mechanisms and policy making environment.

Per interview, there is a “tradeoff between reliability and the relevance of the information” that represents “a big dilemma among standard setters, who I think are feeling pressure to change the accounting system in a way that provides more information.”

Which, everyone thinks, is a good thing. But it may be exactly the opposite.

“One of the main results — and it’s a very intuitive one — shows that when markets don’t trust firms, we will tend to see a shift toward financial statements becoming harder and harder. [and] …a firm that proportionally provides more hard information is more likely to manipulate whatever soft information it does provide. In other words, you should be more wary about the soft information of a firm that is providing a lot of hard information.”

Again, best to look at the actual paper to gain better insight into what Marinovic is saying here.

Quoting from the paper: “...a manager who is more likely to misreport is more willing to verify and release hard information, even though issuing hard information reduces her ability to manipulate. To explain this key property of our model, we reiterate that not all information can be made hard. Hence, what managers lose in terms of discretion to over-report the verifiable information, they can gain in credibility for the remaining soft disclosure. Untruthful managers will tend to issue higher soft reports, naturally facing stronger market skepticism. We demonstrate that untruthful managers are always more willing to issue hard information, relative to truthful managers."

Key insight: "...situations in which managers release more hard information are also more likely to feature aggressive soft reports and have a greater likelihood of issuing overstatements.”

As the result, as noted in the interview, “…we should expect huge frauds, huge overstatements precisely in settings or markets where there is a lot of credibility. The markets believe the information because they perceive the environment as credible, which encourages more aggressive manipulations from dishonest managers who know they are trusted. In other words, there is a relationship between the frequency and magnitude of frauds, where a lower frequency should lead to a larger magnitude.”

In other words, when markets are complacent about information disclosed and/or markets have greater trust in the disclosures mandates (high regulation barrier), information can be of lower quality and/or risk of large fraud cases rises. While this is intuitive, the end game here is not as clear cut: heavily regulating information flows might be not necessarily a productive response because markets trust has a significant positive value.

Let’s dip into the original paper once again, for more exposition on this paradox: “We consider the consequence of reducing the amount of discretion in the reporting of any verifiable information. The mandatory disclosure of hard information has the unintended consequence of reducing information about the soft, unverifiable components of firm value. In other words, there is a trade-off between the quality of hard versus soft information. Regulation cannot increase the social provision of one without reducing the other.”

Now, take European banks (U.S. banks face much of the same). Under the unified supervision by the ECB within the European Banking Union framework, banks are required to report increasingly more and more hard information. In Bertomeu-Marinovic model this can result in reduced incidence of smaller fraud cases and increased frequency and magnitude of large fraud cases. Which will compound the systemic risks within the financial sector (small frauds are non-systemic; large ones are). The very disclosure requirement mechanism designed to reduce large fraud cases can mis-fire by producing more systemic cases.

In its core, Jeremy Bertomeu and Ivan Marinovic paper shows that “certain soft disclosures may contain as much information as hard disclosures, and we establish that: (a) exclusive reliance on soft disclosures tends to convey bad news, (b) credibility is greater when unfavorable information is reported and (c) misreporting is more likely when soft information is issued jointly with hard information. We also show that a soft report that is seemingly unbiased in expectation need not indicate truthful reporting.”

So here is a kicker: “We demonstrate that …the aggregation of hard with soft information will turn all information soft.” In other words, soft information tends to fully cancel out hard information, when both types of information are present in the same report.

Now, give this a thought: many sectors today (think ICT et al) are full of soft information reporting and soft metrics targeting. Which, in Bertomeu-Marinovic model renders all information, including hard corporate finance metrics, reported by these sectors effectively soft (non-verifiable). This, in turn, puts into question all pricing frameworks based on corporate finance information whenever they apply to these sectors and companies.



References for the above are:

The Interview with Marinovic can be read here: https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/financial-disclosures-not-all-information-equal.

Peer reviewed publication (gated version) of the paper is here: http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/faculty-research/publications/theory-hard-soft-information

Open source publication is here: Bertomeu, Jeremy and Marinovic, Ivan, A Theory of Hard and Soft Information (March 16, 2015). Accounting Review, Forthcoming; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 194: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2497613.