Showing posts with label Advanced economies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Advanced economies. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 2, 2018

2/10/18: Government Debt per Employed Person


We often see Government debt expressed in reference to GDP or in per capita terms. However, carry capacity of sovereign debt depends not as much on the number of people in the economy, but on the basis of those paying the lion’s share of taxes, aka, working individuals. So here is the data for advanced economies Government debt expressed in U.S. dollar terms per person in employment:


Some interesting observations.

Ireland, as a younger, higher employment economy ranks fifth in the world in terms of Government debt per person employed (USD 115,765 in debt per employed). In terms of debt per capita, it is ranked in the fourth place at USD 54,126.

Plucky Iceland, the country hit as hard by the Global Financial Crisis as Ireland and often compared to the latter by a range of analysts and policymakers, ranks 22nd in terms of Government debt burden per employed person (USD 56,185) although it ranks 13th in per capita terms (USD 32,502). In simple terms, Iceland has higher employment rate than Ireland, resulting in lower burden per employed person.

When one considers the fact that non-Euro area countries have more sovereign control over their monetary policies, allowing them to carry higher levels of debt than common currency area members, Irish debt per employed person is the third highest in the world after Italy and Belgium, and higher than that of Greece.

Out of top ten debtors (in terms of Government debt per employed person), six are euro area member states (10 out top 15).

Looking solely at the euro area countries, Ireland’s position in terms of debt per capita is woeful: the country has the highest debt per capita of all euro area states at EUR43,659 per person, with Belgium coming in second place with EUR40,139. In per-employee terms, Ireland takes the third highest place in the euro area with EUR93,378 in Government debt, after Italy (EUR98,314) and Belgium (EUR94,340).

Tuesday, May 8, 2018

8/5/18: Germany's ifo: World Economic Climate Deteriorates


Here is the summary of the Germany's ifo Institute World Economic Climate outlook update (emphasis is mine):

"The ifo World Economic Climate has deteriorated. The indicator dropped from 26.0 points to 16.5 points in the second quarter, returning to more or less the same level as in the fourth quarter of 2017. Experts’ assessments of the current economic situation remained as favourable as last quarter, but their expectations are far less optimistic. The world economy is still experiencing an upturn, but it is losing impetus.

The economic climate deteriorated in nearly all regions. Both assessments of the current economic situation and expectations fell significantly in the USA. In the European Union, Latin America, the CIS countries, the Middle East and North Africa economic expectations also cooled down. Assessments of the current economic situation, by contrast, improved. Economic expectations also clouded over in the Asian emerging economies and developing countries. Assessments of the current economic situation, by contrast, remained more or less unchanged.

In line with rising inflation expectations, short and long-term interest rates will rise over the next six months. Experts also expect far weaker growth in world trade, partly because they are reckoning with higher trade barriers. Overall, experts expect world gross domestic product to increase by 3.9 percent this year."




This is in line with my recent warnings on the pressures building up in the global economy, as raised in a series of recent articles for the Sunday Business Post see http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/04/27418-global-growth-and-irelands.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/02/27218-volatility-uncertainty-are-back.html, and for the Cayman Financial Review see: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2018/04/27418-goldilocks-economy-of-state.html.

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

12/4/16: Look, Ma... It's [not] Working: IMF & the R-word


A handy chart from the IMF highlighting changes over the last 12 months in forecast probability of recession 12mo forward across the global economy



Yes, things are getting boomier... as every major region, save Asia and ROW are experiencing higher probability of recession today than in both October 2015 and April 2015, and as probability of a recession in 2016 is now above 30 percent for the Euro area and above 40 percent for Japan.

In that 'repaired' world of Central Banks' activism (described here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2016/04/12416-imf-rip-growth-update-risks.html) we can only dream of more assets purchases and more government debt monetizing, and more public investment on things we all can't live without...

Because, look, it's working:

12/4/16: IMF (RIP) Growth Update: Risks Realism, Policy Idiocy


IMF WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK update out today (we don’t yet have full data set update).

Top line forecasts published confirm what we already knew: global economic growth is going nowhere, fast.  Actually, faster than 3 months ago.

Run through top figures:

  • Global growth: In October 2015 (last full data update we had), the forecast for 2016-2017 was 3.6 percent and 3.8 percent. Now, it is 3.2 percent and 3.5 percent. Cumulated loss (over 2016-2017) of 0.725 percentage points in world GDP within a span 6 months.
  • Advanced Economies growth: October 2015 forecast was for 2.2% in 2016 and 2.2% in 2017. Now: 1.9% and 2.0%. Cumulated loss of 0.51 percentage points in 6 months
  • U.S.: October 2015 outlook estimated 2016-2017 annual rate of growth at 2.8 percent. April 2016 forecast is 2.4% and 2.5% respectively, for a cumulative two-years loss in growth terms of 0.72 percentage points
  • Euro area: the comatose of growth were supposed to eek out GDP expansion of 1.6 and 1.7 percent in 2016-2017 under October 2015 forecast. April 2016 forecast suggests growth is expected to be 1.5% and 1.6%. The region remains the weakest advanced economy after Japan
  • Japan is now completely, officially dead-zone for growth. In October 2015, IMF was forecasting growth of 1% in 2016 and 0.4% in 2017. That was bad? Now the forecast is for 0.5% and -0.1% respectively. Cumulated loss in Japan’s real GDP over 2016-2017 is 1.005 percentage points.
  • Brazil: Following 3.8 contraction in 2015 is now expected to produce another 3.8 contraction in real GDP in 2016 before returning to 0.00 percent growth in 2017. Contrast this with October WEO forecast for 2016 growth at -1% and 2017 forecast for growth of +2.3% and you have two-years cumulated loss in real GDP of a whooping 5.08 percentage points.
  • Russia: projections for 2016-2017 growth published in October 2015 were at -0.6% and 1% respectively. New projections are -1.8% and +0.8%, implying a cumulative loss in real GDP outlook for 2016-2017 of 1.41 percentage points.
  • India: The only country covered by today’s update with no revisions to October 2015 forecasts. IMF still expects the country economy to expand 7.5% per annum in both 2016 and 2017
  • China: China is the only country with an upgrade for forecasts for both 2016 and 2017 compared to both January 2016 and October 2016 IMF releases. Chinese economy is now forecast to grow 6.5% and 6.2% in 2016 and 2017, compared to October 2015 forecast of 6.3% and 6.0%.


Beyond growth forecasts, IMF also revised its forecasts for World Trade Volumes. In October 2015, the Fund projected World Growth to expand at 4.1% and 4.6% y/y in 2016 and 2017. April 2016 update sees this growth falling to 3.1% and 3.8%, respectively. And this is without accounting for poor prices performance.

In short, World economy’s trip through the Deadville (that started around 2011) is running swimmingly:





Meanwhile, as IMF notes, “financial risks prominent, together with geopolitical shocks, political discord”. In other words,we are one shock away from a disaster.

IMF response to this is: "The current diminished outlook calls for an immediate, proactive response… To support global growth, …there is a need for a more potent policy mix—a three-pronged policy approach based on structural, fiscal, and monetary policies.” In other words, what IMF thinks the world needs is:

  1. More private & financial debt shoved into the system via Central Banks
  2. More deficit spending to boost Government debt levels for the sake of ‘jobs creation’, and
  3. More tax ‘rebalancing’ to make sure you don’t feel too wealthy from (1) and (2) above, whilst those who do get wealthy from (1) and (2) - aka banks, institutional investors, crony state-connected contractors - can continue to enjoy tax holidays.

In addition, of course, the fabled IMF ‘structural reforms’ are supposed to benefit the World Economy by making sure that labour income does not get any growth any time soon. Because, you know, someone (labour earners) has to suffer if someone (banks & investment markets) were to party a bit harder… for sustainability sake.

IMF grafts this idiocy of an advice onto partially realistic analysis of underlying risks to global growth:

  • “The recovery is hampered by weak demand, partly held down by unresolved crisis legacies, as well as unfavorable demographics and low productivity growth. In the United States, ..domestic demand will be supported by strengthening balance sheets, no further fiscal drag, and an improving housing market. These forces are expected to offset the drag to net exports coming from a strong dollar and weaker manufacturing.” One wonders if the IMF noticed rising debt levels in households (car loans, student loans) or U.S. corporates, or indeed the U.S. Government debt dynamics
  • “In the euro area, low investment, high unemployment, and weak balance sheets weigh on growth…” You can’t but wonder if the IMF actually is capable of seeing households of Europe as still being somewhat economically alive.


But the Fund does see incoming risks rising: “In the current environment of weak growth, risks to the outlook are now more pronounced. These include:

  • A return of financial turmoil, impairing confidence. For instance, an additional bout of exchange rate depreciations in emerging economies could further worsen corporate balance sheets, and a sharp decline in capital inflows could force a rapid compression of domestic demand. [Note: nothing about Western Banks being effectively zombified by capital requirements uncertainty, corporate over-leveraging, still weighted down by poor quality assets, etc]
  • A sharper slowdown in China than currently projected could have strong international spillovers through trade, commodity prices, and confidence, and lead to a more generalized slowdown in the global economy. 
  • Shocks of a noneconomic origin—related to geopolitical conflicts, political discord, terrorism, refugee flows, or global epidemics—loom over some countries and regions and, if left unchecked, could have significant spillovers on global economic activity.”


The key point, however, is that with currently excessively leveraged Central Banks’ balance sheets and with interest rates being effectively at zero, any of the above (and other, unmentioned by the IMF) shocks can derail the entire wedding of the ugly groom with an unsightly bride that politicians around the world call ‘the ongoing recovery’. And that point is only a sub-text to the IMF latest update. It should have been the front page of it.

So before anyone noticed, almost a 1,000 rate cuts around the world later, and roughly USD20 trillion in various asset purchasing programmes around the globe, trillions in bad assets work-outs and tens of trillions in Government and corporate debt uplifts, we are still where we were: at a point of system fragility being so acute, even the half-blind moles of IMF spotting the shine of the incoming train.

Friday, February 19, 2016

19/2/16: OECD Data Sums Up the 'Repaired' Advanced Economies State of Disaster


Just because everything has been so thoroughly repaired when it comes to the Advanced Economies, growth of real GDP in the OECD area has been falling for three consecutive quarters through 4Q 2015. Of course, you wouldn't know as much if you listen to exhortations of Europe's leaders, but... per OECD latest statistical update, in 2Q 2015, q/q real GDP growth across the advanced economies was 0.6%, falling to 0.5% in 3Q 2015 and to 0.2% in 4Q 2015. Which puts 4Q 2015 growth of 0.2% at lowest level since 1Q 2013.


In the U.S., economic growth slowed to 0.2% in the fourth quarter, against 0.5% in the third quarter, marking second consecutive quarter of growth slowdown. Small uptick in UK growth to 0.5% in 4Q 2015 still puts end of 2015 growth rate at below 1Q 2010-present average and at joint second lowest reading since 1Q 2013.


And there has been no acceleration in growth in the euro area's Big 4 for two consecutive quarters now, with both Italy and France dancing dangerously closely to hitting negative growth and Germany posting lacklustre growth since 1Q 2015.

Per OECD release, "Year-on-year GDP growth for the OECD area slowed to 1.8% in the fourth quarter of 2015, down from 2.1% in the previous quarter. Among the Major Seven economies, the United Kingdom (1.9%) and the United States (1.8%) continued to record the highest annual growth rates, although both down from a rate of 2.1% in the previous quarter. Japan recorded the lowest annual growth rate, 0.7% compared with 1.6% in the previous quarter."

About that 'normalised' and 'repaired' global economy, thus... 

Sunday, January 10, 2016

10/1/16: Crisis Contagion from Advanced Economies into BRIC


New paper available: Gurdgiev, Constantin and Trueick, Barry, Crisis Contagion from Advanced Economies into Bric: Not as Simple as in the Old Days (January 10, 2016). 

Forthcoming as Chapter 11 in Lessons from the Great Recession: At the Crossroads of Sustainability and Recovery, edited by Constantin Gurdgiev, Liam Leonard & Alejandra Maria Gonzalez-Perez, Emerald, ASEJ, vol 18; ISBN: 978-1-78560-743-1. Link: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2713335.



Abstract:      

At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-2008, majority of the analysts and policymakers have anticipated contagion from the markets volatility in the advanced economies (AEs) to the emerging markets (EMs). This chapter examines the volatility spillovers from the AEs’ equity markets (Japan, the U.S and Europe) to four key EMs, the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China). The period under study, from 2000 through mid-2014, reflects a time of varying regimes in markets volatility, including the periods of dot.com bubble, the Global Financial Crisis and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, the Great Recession and the start of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. To estimate volatility cross-linkages between the advanced economies and BRIC, we use multivariate GARCH BEKK model across a number of specifications. We find that, the developed economies weighted return volatility did have a significant impact on volatility across all four of the BRIC economies returns. However, contrary to the consensus view, there was no evidence of volatility spillover from the individual AEs onto BRIC economies with the exception of a spillover from Europe to Brazil. The implied forward-looking expectations for markets volatility had a strong and significant spillover effect onto Brazil, Russia and China, and a weaker effect on India. The evidence on volatility spillovers from the advanced economies markets to emerging markets puts into question the traditional view of financial and economic systems sustainability in the presence of higher orders of integration of the global monetary and financial systems. Overall, data suggests that we are witnessing less than perfect integration between BRIC economies and advanced economies markets to-date.

Wednesday, December 30, 2015

30/12/15: Blink by 25bps, chew through billions: U.S. rates 'normalization'


In a post yesterday, I mentioned USD3 trillion hole in global bonds markets looming on the horizon as the U.S. Fed embarks on its cautious tightening cycle. Now, couple more victims of that fabled 'normalization' that few in the markets expected.

First up, U.S. own bonds:

Source: @Schuldensuehner 

As noted, US 2-year yields are now at 1.09%, their highest level since April 2010 and roughly double January 2015 average. Now, estimated interest on U.S. federal debt in 2015 stood at around USD251 billion for publicly held debt of USD13,124 billion. Now, suppose we slap on another 0.55%-odd on that. That pushes interest payments on publicly held portion of U.S. debt pile to over USD323 billion. Not exactly chop change...

And another casualty of 'normalization' - global profit margins per BCA Research:
"Over the past two decades, the G7 yield curve has been an excellent leading indicator of global margins. Currently, not only are short-term borrowing costs becoming prohibitive, at the margin, but the incentive to raise debt and retire equity to boost EPS is diminishing. This suggests that profit margins have likely peaked for the cycle."

Here's a chart showing both:
Source: BCA Research

Now, absence of margins = absence of capex. And absence of margins = profits growth on scale alone. Both of which mean things are a not likely to be getting easier for global growth.

Now, take BCA conclusion: "Finally, global junk bonds are pointing to a drop in equities in the coming months, if the historical correlation holds. Indeed, we are heeding the bond market’s message, and are concerned about margin trouble and the potential for an EM non-financial corporate sector accident: remain defensively positioned."

In other words, given the leverage take on since the crisis, and given the prospects for organic growth, as well as the simple fact that advanced economies' corporates have been reliant for a good part of decade and a half on emerging markets to find growth opportunities, all this rates 'normalizing' ain't hitting the EMs alone but is bound to under the skin of the U.S. and European corporates too.

Good luck trading on current equity markets valuations for long...

Monday, November 30, 2015

30/11/15: WarningSignals on Secular Stagnation Threats


The readers of this blog know that I have been covering the twin theses of Secular Stagnation (long-term trend in slowdown of global growth) consistently over recent years.

Here is an interesting summary of the theses and literature on it, with extensive references to this blog (among other sources): http://www.warningsignals.org/#!Where-are-we-on-Secular-Stagnation/covf/565464fb0cf29e70f2253e70.

My own view summarised most recently here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/10/41015-secular-stagnation-and-promise-of.html.

Sunday, October 4, 2015

4/10/15: Secular Stagnation and the Promise of the Recovery


An unedited version of my recent requested guest contribution for News Max on the issue of secular stagnation (July-August 2015).

Secular Stagnation and the Promise of the Recovery

Recent evidence on economic growth dynamics presents a striking paradox. As traditional business cycles go, recovery period following a prolonged recession should follow certain historical regularities. Shortly after exiting a recession, growth in productivity, output, investment and demand accelerates and exceeds pre-crisis growth.

These stylized facts are absent from the data for the major advanced economies to-date, prompting three distinct responses from the economic growth analysts. On the one hand, there are proponents of two theories of secular stagnation – an idea that structurally, long-term growth in the advanced economies has come to a grinding halt either due to the demand side collapse, or due to the supply side exhausting drivers for growth. On the other hand, the recovery bulls continue to argue that the turnaround reflective of a traditional recovery is likely to materialize sometime soon.

In my opinion, neither one of the three views of the current economic cycle is correct or sufficient in explaining the lack of robust global recovery from the crises of 2007-2009 and 2011-2014. Instead, the complete view of today’s economy should integrate the ongoing secular stagnation thesis spanning both the supply and the demand sides of the global economy.

The end game for investors is that no traditional indexing or asset class approach to constructing investor portfolios will offer a harbor from the post-QE re-pricing of economic fundamentals. Instead, longer-term strategy for addressing these risks calls for investors targeting smaller clusters of opportunities in sectors that can be viewed as buffers against the secular stagnation trends. Along the same lines of reasoning, forward-looking economic policymaking should also focus on enhancing such clustered opportunities.

Investment-Savings Mismatch

The demand-based view of secular stagnation suggests that the global growth slowdown is linked to a structural decline in consumption and investment, reflected in a decades-long glut of aggregate savings over investment.

This theory, tracing back to the 1930s suggestion by Alvin Hansen, made its first return to the forefront of macroeconomic thinking back in the 1990s, in the context of Japan. By the early 1990s, Japan was suffering from a demographics-linked excess of savings relative to investment, and the associated massive contraction in labor productivity. During the 1980-1989 period, Japan's real GDP per worker averaged 3.2 percent per annum. Over the following two decades, the average was 0.81 percent. Meanwhile, Japan's investment as a percentage of GDP gradually fell from approximately 29-30 percent in the 1980s to just over 20 percent in 2010-2015.

The Great Recession replicated Japanese experience across the majority of advanced economies. Between 1980 and 2014, the gap between savings and investment as percentage of GDP has widened in North America and the Euro area. At the same time, labor productivity fell precipitously across all major advanced economies, despite a massive increase in unemployment.

Some opponents of the demand side secular stagnation thesis, most notably former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, argue that low interest rates create incentives for investment and reduced saving by lowering the cost of the former and increasing the opportunity cost of the latter.

However, this argument bears no connection to what is happening on the ground. Current zero rates policies appear to reinforce the savings-investment mismatch, not weaken it, rendering monetary policy impotent, if not outright damaging.

How can this be the case?

Today's pre-retirement generations are facing insufficient pensions coverage. For them, lower yields on retirement investments, tied to lower policy rates, are incentivizing more aggressive savings, further suppressing returns on investment. Meanwhile, middle age workers face severe pressures to deleverage their debts accumulated before the crisis, while supporting ageing parents and, simultaneously, increasing numbers of stay-at-home young adults.

To address the demand-side of secular stagnation in the short run, requires lifting the natural rate of return on investment, without increasing retail interest rates. This will be both tricky for policymakers and painful for a large number of investors, currently crowded into an over-bought debt markets.

The only way real natural rate of return to investment can rise in the environment of continued low policy and retail rates is by widening the margin between equity and debt returns for non-financial assets and reducing tax subsidies awarded to physical and financial capital accumulation. In other words, policymakers must rebalance taxation systems to support real enterprise formation, entrepreneurship and equity investment, while reducing incentives to invest in debt and financial assets.

Good examples of such policy tools deployment can be found in the areas of gas and oil infrastructure LLPs and property REITs used to fund long-term physical capital investments via tax optimized returns structures. Transforming these schemes to broader markets and to cover non-financial, technological and human capital investments, however, will be tricky.

From the investor perspective, the demand-side stagnation thesis implies that  longer-term investment opportunities will be found in allocations targeting entrepreneurs and companies with organic growth that are debt-light, technologically intensive (with a caveat explained below) and human capital-rich. There are no real examples of such companies currently in the major stock markets’ indices. Instead, the future growth plays are found in the high risk space of start ups and early stage development ventures in the sectors that bring technology directly to end-user engagement: biotech, nanotechnology, remote health, food sciences, wearables, bio-human interfaces and artificial intelligence.

Tech Sector: Value-Added  Miss

The caveat relating to technology investments briefly mentioned above is non-trivial.

Today, we have two distinct trends in technological innovation: technological research that leads to increased substitution of labor with technology and innovations that promise greater complementarity between labor and human capital and the machines.

The first type of innovation is what the financial markets are currently long. And it is also directly linked to the supply-side secular stagnation thesis formulated by Robert Gordon in the late 2000s. The thesis challenges the consensus view that the current technological revolution will continue to fuel a perpetual growth cycle.

Per Gordon, "The frontier established by the U.S. for output per capita, and the U. K. before it, … reached its fastest growth rate in the middle of the 20th century, and has slowed down since.  It is in the process of slowing down further." The reason for this is the exhaustion of economic returns to technological innovation.  Financial returns are yet to follow, but inevitably, with time, they will.

Gordon, and his followers, argue that a sequence of three industrial or technological revolutions explains the historically unprecedented pace of growth recorded since the mid-18th century. "The first with its main inventions between 1750 and 1830 created steam engines, cotton spinning, and railroads. The second was the most important, with its three central inventions of electricity, the internal combustion engine, and running water with indoor plumbing, in the relatively short interval of 1870 to 1900.” However, after 1970 “productivity growth slowed markedly, most plausibly because the main ideas of [the second revolution] had by and large been implemented by then.” Thus, the computer and internet age – the ongoing third revolution – has reached its climax in the late 1990s and the productivity gains from the new computer technologies has been declining since around 2000.


Gordon’s argument is not about the levels of activity generated by the new technologies, but about the declining rate of growth in value added arising form them. This argument is supported by some of the top thinkers in the tech sector, notably the U.S. tech entrepreneur and investor, Peter Thiel.

The older generation of players in the tech sector attempted to challenge Gordon’s ideas, with little success to-date.

A recent study from IBM, titled "Insatiable Innovation: From sporadic to systemic", attempted to show that technological innovation is alive and well, pointing to evolving ‘smart’ tech, globalization of consumer markets, and universal customization of production as signs of potential growth capacity remaining in tech-focused sectors.

However, surprisingly, the study ends up confirming Gordon’s assertion. Tech industry today, by focusing on substituting technology for people in production, is struggling to deliver substantial enough push for growth acceleration. The promise of new technologies that can move companies toward more human capital-intensive modes of production remains the stuff of the future. Meanwhile, marginal returns on investment in today’s technology may be non-negligible from the point of view of individual enterprises, but they cannot deliver rapid rates of growth in economic value added over time and worldwide.


Disruptive Change Required

In my view, the reason for this failure rests with the nature of the modern economy, still anchored to physical capital investment, where technology is designed to replace labor. As I noted in a number of research papers and in my TED presentation a couple of years ago, long-term global growth cycles are sustained by pioneering innovation that moves economic production away from previously exhausted factors (e.g. agricultural land, physical trade routes, steam, internal combustion, electricity, and, most recently capital-enhancing tech) toward new factors.

Thus, the next global growth cycle can only arise from switching away from traditional forms of capital accumulation in favor of structurally new source of growth. The only factor remaining to be deployed in the economy is that of human capital.

Like it or not, to deliver the growth momentum necessary for sustaining the quality of life and improvements in social and economic environment expected by the ageing and currently productive generations will require some radical rethinking of the status quo economic development models.

The thrust of these changes will need to focus on attempting to reverse the decline in returns to human capital investment (education, training, creativity, ability to take and manage risks, entrepreneurship, etc) and on generating higher economic value added growth from technological innovation.

The former implies dramatic restructuring of modern systems of taxation and public services to increase incentives and supports for human capital investments and their deployment in the economy.  The latter requires an equally disruptive reform of the traditional institutions of entrepreneurship and enterprise formation and development.

From investor perspective, this means seeking opportunities to take equity positions in companies with more horizontal, less technocratic distributions of management and ownership. Cooperative, mutual, employees-owned larger ventures and firms offer some attractive longer term valuations in this context. Entrepreneurs who are not afraid to allocate wider ranges of managerial and strategic responsibilities to a broader group of their key employees are also interesting investment targets.

Within sectors, companies that offer more flexible platforms for research and development, product innovation, customer engagement and are design and knowledge-rich will likely outperform their more conservative and rigid counterparts over the long run.


The new world of structurally slower growth does not imply lack of opportunities for investors seeking long run returns. It simply requires a new approach to investment allocation across asset classes and individual investment targets. When both, supply and demand sides of the economic growth equation face headwinds, safe harbours of opportunities lie outside the immediate path of disruption, in the areas of tangible real equity closely linked to the potential drivers of future growth.


Sunday, August 2, 2015

2/8/15: Global Trade: Welcome to the Economic ICU


An interesting, if short, note on woeful state of global trade flows from Fitch (link here).

The key point is that:

  1. Subject to all the talk about the Global recovery gaining momentum; and
  2. Under the conditions of unprecedented past (and ongoing) monetary policy accommodation around the world'

global trade remains severely compressed from mid-2011 forward.


Most importantly, the rot is extremely broad - across all major regions, with no base support for trade flows.

One of the drivers - EMs lack of internal demand:


However, the EMs are just one part of the picture. Per Fitch, "Since 2012, global export volumes have consistently grown by less than 5%. Performance by value has been even worse due to the fall in global trade prices, again led lower by commodities. In April 2015, global export prices were down 16% year on year."

"There are several structural explanations for the continued weakness in global trade in addition to the GFC’s cyclical effects":

  • Shift toward domestic growth in China - previously thought to be a catalyst for growth in trade via stimulating demand for imports - has had an opposite effect: Chinese producers and consumers are now increasingly sourcing goods and services internally. This was not predicted by the analysts, though I have been warning that this will be a natural outcome of the continued maturing of the Chinese economy away from producing low value added goods toward producing higher value added output. Thus, reliance of Chinese economy on capital and investment goods and services imports from Advanced Economies has declined. And we are witnessing an ongoing emergence of higher value added consumer goods manufacturing in China, which will further compress imports demands by Chinese markets. More significantly, over time, this will lead to even more complex regionalisation of trade, with trade flows becoming increasingly locked within the Asia-Pacific region, leaving more and more producers in the Advanced Economies facing an uncomfortable choice: shift production to the region or witness decline in imports demand. In line with this, there will be losses of jobs in the Advanced Economies and gains of activity in Asia-Pacific. 
  • Fitch points to a policy driver for global trade slowdown: "According to the World Trade Organisation, the use of trade restrictions has been rising since the crisis and trade liberalisation initiatives have slowed relative to the 1990s. Together, these developments may be contributing at the margin to the reduction in elasticity of trade with respect to GDP." Nothing new here, as well. The world is amidst continued debt deflation cycle, with debt-linked protectionism on the rise. This is not just about currency wars, but also about financial repression and structural decline in overall growth.
  • Fitch notes a third driver for trade decline: "There has been a change in the relative weights of domestic demand components, with investment falling compared with consumption and government spending… As investment spending is the most pro-cyclical and import-intensive component of domestic demand, a decline in investment tends to have a larger effect on trade." Again, I wrote before extensively on investment collapse in the Advanced Economies, and the fact that the main drivers for this are not a business cycle nor the Global Financial Crisis, but rather a structural decline in long-term growth (secular stagnation). You can read on this more here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/07/7615-secular-stagnation-double-threat.html.


Fitch note, while highlighting a really big theme continuing to unfold across the global economy, misses the real long-term drivers for the collapse of trade: the world is undergoing deleveraging cycle in terms of Government and private debt, reinforced by the structurally weaker growth environment on both demand and supply sides of the growth equation. The result is going to be much more painful that Fitch (and majority of analysts around) can foresee.

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

7/4/15: IMF WEO on Global Investment Slump: Part 2: It's Demand, Not Supply ..

IMF released Chapter 4 of the April 2015 World Economic Outlook update. The chapter covers the issue of lagging growth in private investment (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/c4.pdf).

IMF findings focus on 5 questions:

  1. "Is there a global slump in private investment?"
  2. "Is the sharp slump in advanced economy private investment due just to weakness in housing, or is it broader?"
  3. "How much of the slump in business investment reflects weakness in economic activity?"
  4. "Which businesses have cut back more on investment? What does this imply about which channels—beyond output—have been relevant in explaining weak investment?"
  5. "Is there a disconnect between financial markets and firms’ investment decisions?"


I covered chapter’s main findings for questions 1-2 in the earlier post here: http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2015/04/7415-imf-weo-on-global-investment-slump.html

Now, onto the remaining questions and the core conclusions:

Q3: "The overall weakness in economic activity since the crisis appears to be the primary restraint on business investment in the advanced economies. In surveys, businesses often cite low demand as the dominant factor. Historical precedent indicates that business investment has deviated little, if at all, from what could be expected given the weakness in economic activity in recent years. …Although the proximate cause of lower firm investment appears to be weak economic activity, this itself is due to many factors. And it is worth acknowledging that, as explained in Chapter 3 [of the WEO], a large share of the output loss compared with pre-crisis trends can now be seen as permanent."

Here's a handy chart showing as much:

Figure 4.6. Real Business Investment and Output Relative to Forecasts: Historical Recessions versus Global Financial Crisis (Percent deviation from forecasts in the year of recession, unless noted otherwise; years on x-axis, unless noted otherwise)




Q4: "Beyond weak economic activity, there is some evidence that financial constraints and policy uncertainty play an independent role in retarding investment in some economies, including euro area economies with high borrowing spreads during the 2010–11 sovereign debt crisis. …In particular, firms in sectors that rely more on external funds, such as pharmaceuticals, have seen a larger fall in investment than other firms since the crisis. This finding is consistent with the view that a weak financial system and weak firm balance sheets have constrained investment. Regarding the effect of uncertainty, firms whose stock prices typically respond more to measures of aggregate uncertainty have cut back more on investment in recent years, even after the role of weak sales is accounted for."

Here is an interesting set of charts documenting that financial and policy factors played more significant role in depressing investment in the euro area 'peripheral' states:

Figure 4.10. Selected Euro Area Economies: Accelerator Model—Role of Financial Constraints and Policy Uncertainty (Log index).




Note: in Ireland's case, financial constraints (quality of firms' balance sheets) is the only explanatory factor beyond demand side of the economy for investment collapse in 2013-present, as uncertainty (blue line) strongly diverged from the actual investment dynamics.


Q5: "Finally, regarding the apparent disconnect between buoyant stock market performance and relatively restrained investment growth in some economies, the chapter finds that this too is not unusual. In line with much existing research, it finds that the relationship between market valuations and business investment is positive but weak. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that stock market performance is a leading indicator of future investment, implying that if stock markets remain buoyant, business investment could pick up."

Conclusions

  • So IMF finds no need for any systemic the supply-side adjustments on capital/credit side.
  • It finds no imbalances in the capital markets and finds that demand is the main driver for collapse in investment. 
Where is the need for more 'integration' of the capital markets that the EU is pushing forward as the main tool for addressing low investment levels? Where is the need for more bank credit to support investment? Ah, right, nowhere to be seen…

Meanwhile, the IMF does note the role of debt overhang (legacy debts) in corporate sector as one of the drivers for the current investment slump. "Although this chapter does not further investigate the separate roles of weak firm balance sheets and impaired credit supply, a growing number of studies do so and suggest that both channels have been relevant." In particular, "For example, Kalemli-Ozcan, Laeven, and Moreno (forthcoming) investigate the separate roles of weak corporate balance sheets, corporate debt overhang, and weak bank balance sheets in hindering investment in Europe in recent years using a firm-level data set on small and medium-sized enterprises in which each firm is matched to its bank. They find that all three of these factors have inhibited investment in small firms but that corporate debt overhang (defined by the long-term debt-to-earnings ratio) has been the most
important."

Thus, once again, how likely is it that low cost and abundant credit supply unleashed onto SMEs - as our policymakers in Ireland and the EU are dreaming day after day - will be able to repair investment collapse? Err… not likely.

7/4/15: IMF WEO on Global Investment Slump: Part 1: It's Private Sector Issue..


IMF released Chapter 4 of the April 2015 World Economic Outlook update. The chapter covers the issue of lagging growth in private investment.

Titled "PRIVATE INVESTMENT: WHAT’S THE HOLDUP?", IMF paper starts with a simple, yet revealing summary:
"Private fixed investment in advanced economies contracted sharply during the global financial crisis, and there has been little recovery since. Investment has generally slowed more gradually in the rest of the world. Although housing investment fell especially sharply during the crisis, business investment accounts for the bulk of the slump, and the overriding factor holding it back has been the overall weakness of economic activity. In some countries, other contributing factors include financial constraints and policy uncertainty. These findings suggest that addressing the general weakness in economic activity is crucial for restoring growth in private investment."

So the key message is simple: investment contraction is not driven primarily by the failures of the financial system, but rather by the weak growth - a structural, systemic slowdown in growth. Full text available here: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/pdf/c4.pdf

Let's take a closer look at IMF findings that focus on 5 questions:

  1. "Is there a global slump in private investment?"
  2. "Is the sharp slump in advanced economy private investment due just to weakness in housing, or is it broader?"
  3. "How much of the slump in business investment reflects weakness in economic activity?"
  4. "Which businesses have cut back more on investment? What does this imply about which channels—beyond output—have been relevant in explaining weak investment?"
  5. "Is there a disconnect between financial markets and firms’ investment decisions?"

The chapter’s main findings are as follows (in this post, I will cover questions 1-2 with remaining questions addressed in the follow up post):


Q1: "The sharp contraction in private investment during the crisis, and the subsequent weak recovery, have primarily been a phenomenon of the advanced economies." Across advanced economies, "private investment has declined by an average of 25 percent since the crisis compared with pre-crisis forecasts, and there has been little recovery. In contrast, private investment in emerging market and developing economies has gradually slowed in recent years, following a boom in the early to mid-2000s."

Figure 4.1. Real Private Investment (Log index, 1990 = 0)





Q2: "The investment slump in the advanced economies has been broad based. Though the contraction has been sharpest in the private residential (housing) sector, nonresidential (business) investment—which is a much larger share of total investment—accounts for the bulk (more than two-thirds) of the slump. There is little sign of recovery toward pre-crisis investment trends in either sector."

Figure 4.2. Real Private Investment, 2008–14 (Average percent deviation from pre-crisis forecasts)


Spot Ireland in this…

And per broad spread of contraction, see next:

Figure 4.3. Categories of Real Fixed Investment (Log index, 1990 = 0)



But here's an interesting chart breaking down investment contraction by public v private investment sources:

Figure 4.4. Decomposition of the Investment Slump, 2008–14 (Average percent deviation from spring 2007 forecasts)



This, sort of, flies in the face of those arguing that Government investment should be the driver for growth, as it shows that public investment contraction had at most a mild negative impact on some euro area states (Ireland is included in the above under "Selected euro area").


Next post will cover Questions 3-5 and provide top-level conclusions.

Monday, February 16, 2015

16/2/15: Current Account, Growth and 'Exports-led Recovery': 1999-2014


There is one European economic policy/theory fetishism that stresses the importance of external balance in 'underpinning sustainable' growth. The theory works the following way: countries with external imbalances (e.g. current account deficits) need to enact 'reforms' that would put their economies onto a path of external surpluses. More commonly, this is known as achieving an 'exports-led recovery'.

Set aside the Cartesian logic suggesting that if someone runs a current account surplus, someone else must run a current account deficit. Or in other words, if someone achieves 'sustainable' growth, someone else must be running an 'unsustainable' one.

Look at the actual historical relationship between current account position and growth in income per capita, measured in real (inflation-adjusted terms).

Take the sample of all advanced economies (34 in total, excluding those that we do not have full data for: San Marino and Malta). Take total growth achieved in GDP per capita from the end of 1999 through 2014. And set this against the average current account surplus/deficit achieved over the same period of time.

Chart below illustrates:

Note: there is no point, given the sample size, to deal with non-linear relationship here.

Per chart above, there is, statistically-speaking no relationship between two metrics. Multi-annual growth GDP per capita (in real terms) has basically zero (+0.019) correlation with multi-annual average current account balance. The coefficient of determination is a miserly 0.00036.

Now, cut off the 'outliers' - four countries with lowest GDP per capita: Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Chart below shows new relationship:


Per chart above, there is a very tenuous relationship between multi-annual growth GDP per capita (in real terms) and multi-annual average current account balance, highlighted by a rather weak, but positive correlation of +0.41 between two metrics. The coefficient of determination is around 0.17, which is relatively low for the longer-term averages relationship across the periods that capture both - a slowdown in growth in the 2002, a boom-time performance for both the advanced economies and the global economy during the 2000s and the global crises since 2008.

I tested the same relationship for GDP per capita adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity and the results were exactly identical. Furthermore, removing the three Asia-Pacific growth centres: Taiwan, Korea and Singapore from the sample leads to a complete breakdown of the stronger relationship attained by excluding the Eastern European outliers, with coefficient of determination falling to ca 0.05. Removing these three economies from the sample with Eastern European outliers present results in a negative (but statistically insignificant) relationship between the current account dynamics and growth.

Lastly, it is worth noting that the sample is most likely biased due to policy direction: during economic slowdowns and in poorer performing European economies in general, there is a strong policy bias to actively pursue exports-led growth strategies, while in non-euro area economies this is further reinforced by the pressure to devalue domestic currencies. Which, of course, suggests that the above correlation links are over-stating the true extent of the current account links to growth.

The conclusion from this exercise is simple: there is only a weak evidence to support the idea that for highly advanced economies, rebalancing their economic growth over the longer term toward persistent current account surpluses is associated with sustainable economic growth. And if we are to consider a simple fact that many euro area 'peripheral' economies (e.g. Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain, as well as Slovenia) require higher upfront investments in physical and human capital to deliver future growth, the proposition of desirability of an 'exports-led' recovery model comes into serious questioning.

Wednesday, February 4, 2015

4/2/15: Debt Overhang and Sluggish Growth


Debt overhang and its impact on growth has been a rather controversial topic over the recent years. One of the key contributors to the debate is Kenneth Rogoff. Rogoff has a new paper out on the topic, together with Stephanie Lo, titled "Secular stagnation, debt overhang and other rationales for sluggish growth, six years on" published by the Bank for International Settlements (http://www.bis.org/publ/work482.pdf).

In the paper, Rogoff and Lo state that "there is considerable controversy over why sluggish economic growth persists across many advanced economies six years after the onset of the financial crisis. Theories include a secular deficiency in aggregate demand, slowing innovation, adverse demographics, lingering policy uncertainty, post-crisis political fractionalisation, debt overhang, insufficient fiscal stimulus, excessive financial regulation, and some mix of all of the above." Rogoff and Lo survey "the alternative viewpoints" on the causes of slow growth. The authors argue that "until significant pockets of private, external and public debt overhang further abate, the potential role of other headwinds to economic growth will be difficult to quantify."

Rogoff and Lo focus strongly on the effects of debt overhang on growth. "In our view, the leading candidate as an explanation for why growth has taken so long to normalise is that pockets of the global economy are still experiencing the typical sluggish aftermath of a financial crisis… The experience in advanced countries is certainly consistent with a great deal of evidence on leverage cycles, for example the empirical work of Schularick and Taylor (2012), who examine data for a cross-section of advanced countries going back to the late 1800s and find that the last half-century has brought an unprecedented era of financial vulnerability and potentially destabilising leverage cycles. Moreover, focusing on more recent events, Mian and Sufi’s (2014) estimates suggest that the effects of US household leverage might be large enough to explain the entire decline in both house prices and durable consumption."

Still, their conclusion is very cautious. Instead of assigning direct causality from debt to growth, they suggest increased indeterminacy of the relationship between other variables and growth in the presence of high debt overhangs. They do reinforce the point that the argument about debt overhang relates to the total real economic debt (governments, households and non-financial corporations), not solely to government debt alone.

Friday, December 26, 2014

26/12/2014: Advanced Economies: Public Debt Explosion 2008-2014


Some interesting insight into the legacy of the Great Recession that we are carrying over into 2015. From the start of 2008 through 2014:

  • Average increase in gross debt of all advanced economies was 27.2 percentage points of GDP, with a range from a decrease of 21 percentage points for Norway and an increase of 88.5 percentage points for Ireland. Thus, the average annualised rate of increase in government debt over the period was around 3.47 percentage points of GDP with a range of -2.76 percentage points annualised decline for Norway and a 9.48 percentage points annualised increase in Ireland.
  • Average change in the gross government debt of the group of countries where debt declined over the crisis was -12.0 percentage points of GDP. There were only 3 countries in this group.
  • Average increase in gross government debt of the group of countries with benign levels of increase (levels of increase consistent roughly with offsetting GDP contraction over the crisis period) was 4.8 percentage points of GDP. There were only 5 countries in this group and only two of these were in Europe, with none (at the time of the crisis onset) being members of the euro area.
  • Average increase in gross government debt within the group of countries where debt rises were moderately in excess of contraction in the economy was 16.4 percentage points of GDP.
  • Average increase in gross government debt within the group of countries with debt increases significantly in excess of economic contraction was 26.6 percent of GDP.
  • Average increase in the government debt within the group of countries with severe debt overhang was 60.4 percentage points of GDP, with a range of increases in this group between 41.6% for the U.S. at the lower end and 88.5% of GDP for Ireland at a higher end.



Chart above summarises these facts and also highlights the extent to which Ireland's government debt increases were out of line with experience in all other countries, including Greece and all other 'peripheral' economies.

The average rise in gross government debt across all peripheral economies 2008-2014 was 56.5 percentage points of GDP (excluding Ireland), which is more than 1/3 lower than that for Ireland. Our closest competitor to the dubious title of worst performing sovereign in terms of debt accumulation is Greece, which experienced a debt/GDP ratio increase almost 1/4 lower than Ireland.

And in case you wonder, our Government's net debt position is not much better: